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Abstract 
The relationship between the EU and New Zealand has expanded considerably since the 
protracted trade negotiations of the 1970s and now includes dialogue and cooperation on a 
range of policy issues. In recent years, environment has become an increasingly high priority 
matter and is increasingly referenced as playing an important part in EU-New Zealand 
relations. At the same time, the EU has been praised for its leadership role in climate change 
negotiations, and some scholars have described it as a “green” normative power with the 
ability to influence other actors internationally on environmental policy. Taking the EU-New 
Zealand relationship on environment as its case study, this thesis attempts to address a gap in 
the academic literature concerning relations between New Zealand and the European Union 
(EU) on environmental issues. It compares and contrasts the concept of EU normative power 
with that of policy transfer, arguing that both address the spread of ideas, but finding that 
what might appear to be normative power and the diffusion of norms, can in fact be best 
explained as policy transfer and the diffusion of policy or knowledge. 
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1: Introduction 
Inspired by statements issued by New Zealand and European Union (EU) representatives 
declaring the desire to work more closely together on environmental issues,1 this thesis seeks 
to reconcile accounts of the EU as a normative power, in particular recent depictions of it 
acting as a “green” normative power in international environmental politics, with the reality 
of relations with a third state as a case study, namely New Zealand. To achieve this aim the 
thesis compares and contrasts a normative power account of the relationship with a policy 
studies approach, in order to analyse the development of dialogue between New Zealand and 
the EU on environmental issues at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. 
1.1 Background 
New Zealand and the European Union (EU) respectively have both come to be perceived 
internationally as environmental leaders: the EU with particular reference to its efforts 
internationally towards tackling climate change, and New Zealand in relation to its well 
promoted international reputation for being „clean and green.‟ Environmental concerns, 
particularly climate change, have become increasingly high profile at the international level 
in recent years, and the proposed responses and issues involved have far-reaching 
implications for a broad range of sectors, from trade and industry to science and technology. 
Delivering the annual Europa Lecture on 27 June 2007 in Wellington, Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations, highlighted the environment – 
specifically energy security and climate change – as one of three key areas in which the EU 
and New Zealand have considerable potential for productive cooperation. In particular, she 
                                                 
1 "The European Union and New Zealand: Joint Declaration on Relations and Cooperation,"  (Delegation of the 
European Commission to New Zealand 2007), Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The European Union and New Zealand 
- New Perspectives," in Europa Lecture (Te Papa Museum, Wellington: 2007). 
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discussed the EU‟s promotion of an international agreement on energy efficiency and invited 
New Zealand to participate. The Commissioner also highlighted the potential for 
collaboration in research on renewable energy and clean technologies under the current 
Science and Technology Cooperation Arrangement. The Seventh Framework Programme 
(FP7), which covers the period 2007-2013, includes a significant focus on the environment, 
an area which the two sides had agreed previously to expand and enhance. 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Winston Peters commented at the signing of the EU-New 
Zealand Joint Declaration on 21 September 2007 in Brussels that New Zealand and the EU 
“work closely together on international issues such as climate change and environmental 
concerns,” in particular within the United Nations framework. The Joint Declaration includes 
a specific section on “Environment and Climate Change”. This section sets out a range of 
broad objectives for joint action and cooperation, and Article 38 in particular specifies a 
number of potential areas of mutual interest in which New Zealand and the EU could 
collaborate.  
In the same way that the European Union (EU) has challenged traditional notions of 
sovereignty and governance, environmental issues, and the need for international 
environmental cooperation to deal with them, pose a challenge to the conventional system of 
state sovereignty and definitions of national interest. Just as the EU has stimulated new 
theoretical approaches to account for its existence and its role, global issues such as climate 
change seem to demand new, non-traditional approaches to accounting for actor behaviour 
and determining actor interests.  
Environmental issues have become highly politicised in a relatively short space of time, at 
both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, the environment is no longer the 
preserve of „Green‟ political parties as concern over environmental questions has become far 
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more widespread, with political parties across the political spectrum in New Zealand, for 
example, adopting policies on sustainability, renewable energies, and greenhouse-gas 
emissions reductions,2 a development that reflects international trends. Internationally, 
environmental questions are considered increasingly important and feature more prominently 
in discussion at bilateral and multilateral levels. Actors are increasingly driven to focus on 
environmental questions in response to a number of factors, including public opinion, 
economic interests, scientific evidence, pressure from lobby groups, and arguably the 
influence of norms. 
Considering the specific nature of environmental politics and cooperation, in which actors 
increasingly appear to promote or to adopt policies and agreements that go against their 
traditional, material interests, it would seem that in this particular policy area, a rational 
approach alone might not be sufficient to explain actor behaviour. This thesis asks if it is 
possible to go deeper than traditional material interests in order to understand environmental 
politics and cooperation, by carrying out a case study of the relationship between New 
Zealand and the EU on environment and asking if norms play a role in this relationship, or if 
it is reducible to less abstract, more pragmatic factors and interests. 
1.2 Conceptual Context 
The thesis compares two theoretical approaches in order to explore and assess the nature of 
the relationship between the European Union and New Zealand on environmental issues. It 
compares a constructivist explanation – in particular the concept of EU normative power – 
with one provided by a policy studies approach, in conjunction with small state theory, a 
subfield of foreign policy analysis. It argues that for normative power to be a valid 
explanation, it must be able to stand on its own. That is, to quote Diez, “Military or economic 
                                                 
2 Greenpeace New Zealand, "The Politics of Climate Change,"  (Auckland: Greenpeace NZ, 2008), 348. 
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power may underpin normative power, but it must not be reducible to either.”3 Therefore the 
case studies carried out in this thesis are designed to investigate whether a constructivist 
approach incorporating normative power and values can explain the dynamics of the 
relationship, or whether a realist approach using policy studies and small state theory 
framework provides a more accurate account of the relationship. 
While numerous discussions of the EU as a normative power have been published since Ian 
Manners first introduced the concept in 2002,4 including a number on the specific nature of 
the EU as an „environmental‟ normative power, the majority appear to have focused either on 
the EU‟s role in international institutions or its role in relation to EU candidate/neighbouring 
countries.5 Robert Falkner recently rejected the concept of the EU as a „green‟ normative 
power in a case study of EU international action in the field of biosafety regulation.6 He 
argued that using the normative concept to explain the EU‟s role in international 
environmental politics lacks historical depth, and “mistakes the export of domestic norms 
with the pursuit of global interests and universal values.”7 Falkner raises a valid point – does 
the term normative power equate with a force for good and imply that the EU pursues a moral 
or ethical agenda? Helene Sjursen assumes that the concept of normative power is in itself a 
normative judgement and equates to ethical power, asking how it can be known that acting as 
a normative power is a good thing? She argues for a conceptual method in order to establish 
whether a pursuit of norms is legitimate.8 Manners revisited his 2002 study and responded to 
                                                 
3 Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'," 
Millenium Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 616. 
4 Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," Journal of Common Market Studies 40, 
no. 2 (2002). 
5 John Vogler, "The European Contribution to Global Environmental Governance," International Affairs 81, no. 
4 (2005). 
6 Robert  Falkner, "The Political Economy of 'Normative Power' Europe: E.U. Environmental Leadership in 
International Biotechnology Regulation," Journal of European Public Policy 14, no. 4 (2007). 
7 Ibid.: 511. 
8 Helene Sjursen, "The EU as a „Normative‟ Power: How Can This Be?," Journal of European Public Policy 13, 
no. 2 (2006): 242. 
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critics by drawing a clear distinction between describing the international action and impact 
EU as a normative power and arguing that the EU follows an ethical foreign policy.9  
This thesis investigates the validity of the concept of EU normative power specifically on 
environment and specifically in relation to its dialogue at all levels with a single third state – 
New Zealand. It assesses this dialogue and investigates whether the dynamics of the 
relationship indicate the EU as having a normative influence on New Zealand. A 
constructivist, normative power explanation will be compared and contrasted with a policy 
studies approach, incorporating small state theory.  
Hypothetically, if the EU is in fact acting as a „green‟ normative power, then this should be 
evident in its relations not only in international regimes and with immediate neighbours, but 
also with a small state on the other side of the planet such as New Zealand. The EU has 
gained an international reputation as a leader in international environmental politics and is 
known for its stringent domestic regulation while New Zealand frequently promotes itself as 
being „clean and green‟ and environmentally friendly.  
Relatively few scholarly studies of the EU‟s relations with New Zealand have been 
published, and in particular the specific „environment‟ aspect of EU-New Zealand dialogue 
does not appear to have been examined in detail before. It is important that this research be 
carried out because the level of political focus on environmental issues at both the domestic 
and international level is increasingly intense. Environmental issues impact on a range of 
policy areas, but the relationship to trade is perhaps the most challenging. The EU is New 
Zealand‟s second largest trading partner; therefore it makes sense that effective dialogue with 
the EU on the environment be a priority for New Zealand. It is anticipated that the resulting 
document will make a positive contribution to studies of the European Union as a normative 
                                                 
9 Ian Manners, "The Normative Ethics of the European Union," International Affairs 84, no. 1 (2008): 46. 
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power in the environmental arena, and to studies of New Zealand‟s foreign relations and 
international environmental politics, in addition to being of practical use in consolidating EU-
New Zealand environmental dialogue, cooperation and action. 
1.3 Research Question and Guiding Sub-questions 
With these intentions in mind, the thesis research question has been formulated as follows: 
How valid is the concept of EU normative power in explaining efforts to develop a 
cooperative relationship between the EU and New Zealand on environmental issues when 
compared with theories of policy studies? How, by analysing interactions and identifying 
areas of potential common interests, could this relationship be further enhanced?  
The sub-questions guiding the research are: 
 What is normative power and how can it be identified?  
 What is policy transfer and how can it be identified? 
 What are the environmental „cultures‟ of the EU and New Zealand? Given that 
normative power and constructivism place considerable importance on identities and 
ideas in accounting for behaviour and in assessing power, it is important to understand 
what values and identities exist in the EU and New Zealand in order to assess the 
importance of their role, if any, in shaping the relationship. At the same time, it is 
important to understand the existing policy structures and preferences present within 
New Zealand and the EU as they are relevant to a policy studies framework. 
 What efforts (at EU and NZ government level) have been made to develop the 
relationship on environment?  
 Is the EU shown to be an important policy learning source for New Zealand? If so, is 
this for normative or material reasons? 
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1.4 Delimitations and Definition of Terms 
The thesis uses two case studies to examine the role of the EU in the international 
environmental arena, and to question depictions of the EU as a „green‟ normative power. 
Because the term „environment‟ encapsulates a broad range of policy areas and touches on a 
variety of industries, and because it is an area that is evolving very quickly, it is 
acknowledged that this study will be subject to limitations of space and time. To assess in 
depth the EU‟s role in all areas that could be described as having an environmental element 
would be a mammoth task and it would be almost impossible to draw conclusions based on 
such varied information. 
This thesis defines normative power as the ability and the intent to export or externalise 
norms and values (in this case those of the EU) using power over ideas and opinions. This 
thesis assumes that the concept does not intend to make a judgment on the moral value of 
those norms, or whether or not this makes the EU a „force for good‟. Ultimately, the 
interpretation of normative power used here is less concerned about the moral value of EU 
normative power, and more concerned about whether or not it is actively pursued in its 
foreign relations, and whether this alleged power can be shown to result in a normative effect 
on a third state. The normative effect is the internalisation of the „exported‟ norms by the 
third state – it is not enough for a state to comply with the norm, it must be shown to have 
adopted the norm as part of its identity. Care will be taken not to confuse the terms 
„normative‟ and „civilian‟ though they are closely related.  
Policy transfer is defined as the process in which knowledge or processes from one context 
are applied to another context. Policy transfer in itself is a descriptive concept – placed within 
a wider policy studies context, in which policy processes and decision making play an 
important role, it can provide a more realist, pragmatic account for the spread of knowledge.  
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The term „EU‟ will be used in most cases to refer to the European Union and the pre-
Maastricht treaty European Community. It is necessary to clarify the terms used to describe 
the EU over the course of its history as this study will cover a period in which the structure of 
the EU was quite different to that of today. Until 1987 the EU was known as the European 
Economic Community (EEC), but the Single Economic Act (SEA) of that year changed it to 
the European Community (EC). This was in place until the Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) in 1993 renamed it the European Union and reorganized its structure 
into three „pillars‟, the first pillar of which is the Community pillar and where the EU‟s 
environmental policy is made. For simplicity and clarity, this thesis will refer to the EU 
throughout when referring to general concepts, but will specify EC or EEC as necessary.  
It should be noted that the subjects of this thesis are New Zealand and the European Union; 
that is, the EU as a bloc, and that therefore no explicit inquiry is made to bilateral relations 
that may exist between New Zealand and individual EU member states. 
Finally, references to New Zealand and New Zealand government policy refer, unless 
explicitly stated, to the fifth Labour Government which was voted out of government on 8 
November 2008. This is because the case studies in the thesis are effectively historical, in 
particular the major case study on development of New Zealand‟s emissions trading scheme, 
and also because primary research was conducted prior to the change of government. Any 
reference to the current National Government will be made explicitly clear.  
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1.6 Methodology and Research Design 
To establish whether the EU exercises a normative role in the context of environmental 
issues, the thesis analyses the relationship on a broad range of environmental issues between 
the EU and a specific third state – New Zealand. Rather than examine the EU‟s effect through 
a particular international regime or within a specific policy area, the case of relations with a 
third state has been chosen in order to encompass a broad range of policy areas and therefore 
give as wide a view as possible of the EU as an environmental actor in this context. In 
chapter four, mini case studies covering relations on chemical and waste management, 
research, science and technology, biodiversity and trade and environment are carried out. 
These policy areas were chosen because of the relatively high level of interaction between the 
parties on these topics. A final, narrower case study in chapter five narrows the focus by 
examining the specific relations between the EU and New Zealand on climate change issues. 
This area has been chosen as it has enjoyed an increasingly high political profile throughout 
the timeframe to be studied (since 1991), and the EU‟s alleged rise to a leadership role on the 
issue coincides with this timeframe, allowing the observation of any associated changes in the 
dynamics of EU-New Zealand relations. Because of the high degree of activity in this policy 
area it is most likely to yield enough data to be assessed accurately. The potential pitfalls of 
choosing too narrow a topic as case study, as well as those posed by the highly political 
nature climate change issues, will be overcome by balancing this narrow case study with the 
broader, more generalized study of the wide-ranging relationship between the two actors.  
By carrying out four mini case studies, as well as a major in-depth case study on the parties‟ 
relationship in climate change issues, the thesis will illustrate what factors influence the 
formulation of their respective environmental foreign policies, and how those policies diverge 
and intersect.  
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The thesis is carried out from a New Zealand perspective. It does not seek to question 
whether or not the EU actively seeks to exercise normative power in its relations with New 
Zealand; instead the thesis assumes that if normative power were present in the relationship, 
this would be evidenced in New Zealand‟s interaction with the EU. New Zealand would 
engage in dialogue for reasons not necessarily related to material interests. Therefore, the 
thesis concerns itself primarily with New Zealand‟s motivations and interests. 
On a conceptual level, the comparison of a constructivist framework with a policy studies 
approach to the study of bilateral environmental relations takes account of the influence of 
ideational factors such as values and norms, and material factors such as economic interest, in 
the development of foreign policy, in this case environmental foreign policy, and in interstate 
cooperation. The thesis, in examining the dynamics of the European Union‟s relations with a 
third state on environment offers insight into the role of the EU as an alleged „normative‟ 
power, and the role of the EU as an important policy learning site for New Zealand. 
1.6.1 Data Collection 
Due to the contemporary nature of the research topic and the novelty of research into EU-
New Zealand relations on environmental issues, there was little secondary material available. 
It was therefore essential to conduct primary research, making use of documents from 
relevant government ministries and conducting interviews with key-informants, political 
elites involved in New Zealand and European Union environmental policy making.  
In New Zealand, the ministries and policy officials most directly involved were the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and the Ministry for the Environment (MfE). The 
Ministries of Transport, Agriculture and Forestry, Economic Development, and the Treasury 
also play an important role. 
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In the EU, the directly relevant bodies were the European Commission, specifically the 
Directorate General (DG) for External Relations (DG Relex), DG Environment and DG 
Research.  
The primary analysis was therefore based on official documents sourced from these bodies, 
and semi-structured elite interviews with a range of officials working within them, carried out 
between July and November 2008. Approval from the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee was granted prior to interviewing. It must be acknowledged that potential 
inaccuracies based on the interview research method apply. The possibility of interviewer and 
interviewee bias must be acknowledged, along with the possibility of selective recall. Further, 
interviews were not recorded; therefore errors may have been made in the transcription 
process. Confidentiality was discussed with all participants prior to interviewing. The 
majority of participants requested anonymity but were happy to be listed by Ministry, while a 
few others were happy to speak openly and be referenced by name. After interviews were 
conducted, notes taken during the course of the interview were e-mailed to participants for 
final approval. 
A total of ten interviews were carried out with officials in New Zealand, the majority in 
Wellington, and three in Brussels. The average interview duration was forty-five minutes. 
In New Zealand, potential interview participants were initially chosen by researching internet 
staff listings for the specified government departments and e-mailing requests to relevant 
staff members. Once contact had been made with one official, they were able to suggest other 
potential participants that may have otherwise been difficult to identify.  
In terms of timing, it is important to note that all interviews in New Zealand were carried out 
prior to the 2008 general election, which took place in November. Comments therefore refer 
to events taking place under the authority of fifth Labour Government. 
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In Brussels, potential participants were identified in much the same way, but with less 
success. This was primarily due to bad timing, as interviews were to be carried out the week 
immediately prior to the fourteenth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which involved DG Environment 
staff and particularly those working on climate change. Unfortunately, it was therefore not 
possible to speak to any representative from DG Environment despite numerous attempts. 
However, a useful background interview was conducted with an official from DG Relex, as 
well as helpful interviews with a New Zealand Government official and Dr Claus Bruening of 
DG Research.  
These interviews were conducted in late November of 2008, less than three weeks after the 
fourth Labour Governemnt were voted out of government and a National coalition came to 
power. At the time, the future priorities of the new government were still unkown, as was the 
future of New Zealand‟s emissions trading scheme, the development of which is the central 
case study in this thesis. Information collected from these interviews therefore generally also 
refers to the situation as it was under the fifth Labour Government.  
Interviews were designed to be semi-structured, using open-ended questions and with 
maximum flexibility to allow participants to speak freely. In most cases the interview 
structure and question format was followed but in a few cases participants that were 
particularly „talkative‟ were encouraged to speak freely, which sometimes led to some 
unexpectedly interesting subjects being addressed. 
Questions were designed according to the theoretical structure of the thesis. Because the 
thesis seeks to compare a normative power approach with a policy transfer approach to the 
EU-New Zealand relationship, it was important to investigate how New Zealand 
policymakers viewed the EU. This is because a normative power approach assumes that the 
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EU has induced a level of normative policy change in New Zealand through interaction. 
Questioning for New Zealand participants was divided into three sections, beginning with 
broad questions about the policy making process in general and narrowing to specific 
questions related to EU-New Zealand interaction. This was in order to place the relationship 
within as broad a context as possible, to gain a clear idea of how much influence, if any, the 
EU could possibly have on New Zealand policy. First, participants were asked to discuss 
problems or issues currently high on the agenda in their organisation and how these are 
generally approached. Then participants were asked about international influences and links 
on their policymaking, and within what contexts they exchanged information and knowledge 
with international counterparts. Finally, participants were asked questions specific to the EU-
New Zealand relationship related to the specific context of interaction, how relations 
compared to relations with other international players, and what they felt the future held for 
the relationship. 
For EU participants, questioning was slightly more targeted to the participants specific area 
of expertise, but still followed the structure outlined above, beginning with broad questions to 
place the EU-New Zealand relationship within a wider context of EU external relations, 
before narrowing to discuss specific issues. 
The information gathered through interviewing was very helpful, particularly given that there 
is no secondary material on this topic. To avoid bias in the results, information gathered from 
interviews was balanced wherever possible with independent points of view such as news 
articles, research reports, and journal articles. However, it would have been desirable to have 
carried out a wider range of interviews with EU officials, in order to gain a better 
understanding of the EU perspective from a wider range of sources.  
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1.7 Thesis Outline 
Chapter Two lays the foundation for the theoretical framework of the thesis, establishing the 
concepts of constructivism and normative power, policy studies and small state theory in 
relation to the thesis. It explains how these two concepts will be contrasted in relation to the 
case studies in order to determine whether normative power can be shown to have a role in 
the EU-New Zealand relationship on environment.  
Chapter Three then analyses the respective environmental „cultures‟ of New Zealand and the 
EU. This chapter examines the respective environmental values and identities of the EU and 
New Zealand, and also provides an overview of the environmental policymaking processes 
relevant to each party. The conclusions reached in this chapter help to inform the later 
conclusions of the nature of the relationship between the EU and New Zealand on 
environmental issues. 
The fourth chapter provides an overview of New Zealand – EU relations on environment. It 
traces the development of the dialogue between the EU and New Zealand specifically on 
environment and provides mini case studies of relations on specific policy areas, with a 
particular focus on the environment-trade nexus. 
Chapter Five is an in-depth case study specifically on EU-New Zealand relations on climate 
change. In particular, it examines cooperation that took place related to development of New 
Zealand‟s emissions trading scheme.  
Chapter Six concludes the thesis by analyzing the conceptual and practical outcomes and 
implications of the research. 
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2: The Power of Ideas: Constructivism, 
Policy Transfer and Small States 
2.1 Introduction 
Constructivism is an increasingly popular framework for the study of international relations, 
and of the European Union. It is not strictly a political studies or international relations 
theory, but is a post-positivist social theory that seeks to explain the influence of identity and 
social norms on actor behaviour. Normative power, whose emphasis on EU identity as a 
source of a unique ideological soft power and norms links it to social constructivism, is a 
concept specifically addressing the European Union. The concept of normative power has 
been increasingly referred to as a tool to explain the unique nature of the EU and its 
international role, but is not without its detractors. Certainly, the EU often describes itself in 
normative terms and places considerable emphasis on its fundamental principles and values 
in its international interactions. This fact alone does not make it unique among other 
international actors who also espouse particular domestic values and seek to elevate them to, 
and spread them within, the international level. However, the foundation of the normative 
power concept, as shall be explained further in this chapter, rests upon the ideological 
influence the EU allegedly exercises by virtue of its unique character. While traditional 
theoretical approaches have struggled to come to terms with the sui generis nature of the EU, 
normative power claims to embrace the challenge that the EU poses to the established 
Westphalian state system and concepts of sovereignty by arguing that this individuality could 
prove its greatest strength, though the concept is not without its critics. 
Studies of policy transfer, also seek to account for the role and spread of ideas. Like 
constructivism and normative power, the concept of policy transfer places emphasis on the 
influence of ideas and knowledge on actor behaviour but places greater importance on agents 
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than on structure. However, while normative power specifically focuses on the EU and the 
spread of ideas in terms of values within a moral frame, for which it is often criticised, policy 
studies explores the role of ideas within a policy setting and seeks to account for their spread 
within that context. In conjunction with policy transfer, it may be helpful to consider small 
state theory, which attempts to understand the foreign policy of small countries. Small state 
theory takes a realist approach to understanding the particular foreign policy behaviour of 
small countries by emphasising the pursuit of material interests and security, and establishes 
the background context of the EU-New Zealand relationship in which policy transfer takes 
place. 
It has been argued that due to the complexity and unique nature of the EU, a single theoretical 
approach is insufficient if attempting to explain its multiple roles and the many facets of its 
personality.10 No attempt is made, therefore to argue that either of the theoretical approaches 
explored in this thesis are the only explanations that may apply to the EU‟s international 
environmental role, or in this specific case, that they are the only approaches that might 
explain aspects of the EU‟s relationship with New Zealand on environmental issues. Instead, 
this thesis seeks to explore the validity of a constructivist approach and the concept of EU 
normative power by applying it to this specific context and case study, and by contrasting it 
with a policy transfer approach. Indeed, as has been argued by Finnemore and Sikkink, no 
account of norms and normative influence can be separated from rationality, and equally, any 
episode of rational choice occurs within a normative context.11  
This thesis uses the case study of EU-New Zealand relations on environment to compare and 
contrast these two frameworks, and in doing so, to explore the limits of constructivism as a 
                                                 
10 Alice Landau, "“Introduction: The European Union in a Changing Context”," in Rethinking the European 
Union - Institutions, Interests and Identities, ed. Alice Landau and Richard Whitman (London: Macmillan Press, 
1997), 1. 
11 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 888. 
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post-positivist approach to the international relations of the European Union, and to 
environmental politics, by assessing the validity of the alleged „normative power‟ of the 
European Union. 
This chapter will lay the groundwork first for the meta-theory of constructivism, with specific 
reference to the study of the EU and international environmental politics. It will discuss in 
greater detail the concept of normative power, as it pertains to the EU and the environment, 
and criticism and debate around this somewhat controversial concept. It will then introduce 
the alternative; a policy transfer approach, supported by small state theory, which will be 
compared and contrasted with constructivism and normative power. 
2.2 Constructivism 
The so-called „constructivist turn‟ in International Relations theory of the 1980s -1990s 
reflected a growing interest in the social aspects of politics in a field dominated by debate 
between neorealist and neo-liberalist schools of thought. Traditionally, studies of 
international politics focused on power and interests as central to explaining actor behaviour. 
In the 1980s, neo-liberals introduced a third factor, arguing for the important influence of 
international institutions. The role of ideas was considered inferior to these three core factors 
until constructivists began to argue that these factors are in fact constituted by ideas, and that 
therefore ideas should be the central focus of studies of international politics.12 
This alternative approach offered a new understanding of many central questions in 
international relations, and involved a move away from traditional actor- and state-centric 
accounts of behaviour and events, towards a method of accounting for the influence of the 
constructed social context within which this behaviour occurs. Constructivism is “not a 
                                                 
12 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press, 
1999), 92-4. 
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substantive theory but an approach to social inquiry” and is based on the assumptions that the 
environment in which actors interact and make decisions is social as well as material, and that 
this context can constitute actors‟ interests. 13 
One of the key constructivist claims is that political actors follow socially defined rules, 
values and norms, even when it may not be directly to their benefit to do so. 14 They argue 
that decisions and actions are always taken in a social context and that when faced with a 
situation, actors do not calculate action according to preferences, but instead refer to 
established social norms to decide what action is appropriate. This is described as the „logic 
of appropriateness‟, which together with the actor‟s sense of identity drives decision-making 
and action. This is in contrast to rationalist explanations of action that posit that actors, when 
confronted with multiple choices, choose the one that best serves their objectives and 
interests; a process called a „logic of consequences‟.15 
Constructivists argue that through interaction with institutions, an actor‟s interests, 
perceptions and identities can all be transformed, as the development of institutions is viewed 
as a process of „mutual constitution‟ between structure and actor, each shaping the other.16 
This is because, constructivists argue, institutions do not only consist of formal rules and 
regulations but also of informal social norms, which shape actors preferences.17 In 
international relations theory, a structure is a set of conditions that constrain and condition 
                                                 
13 Jeffrey C. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," World Politics 50, no. 2 
(1998): 324-5, Joseph Jupille, James A. Caporaso, and Jeffrey C. Checkel, "Integrating Institutions: 
Rationalism, Constructivism and the Study of the European Union," Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 1/2 
(2003): 14. 
14 Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," 324-5, Charlotte Epstein, "The Making 
of Global Environmental Norms: Endangered Species Protection," Global Environmental Politics 6, no. 2 
(2006): 32-3, Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel, "Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism and the 
Study of the European Union," 14. 
15 Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," 327. 
16 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ed., Debates on European Integration: A Reader, The European Union Series 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 393-6., Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (New York: 
St Martin's Press, 2000), 171-3. 
17 Mark A. Pollack, "Theorising EU Policy-Making," in Policy-Making in the European Union, ed. Helen 
Wallace, William Wallace, and Mark A. Pollack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 22-3. 
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state behaviour. They might be material conditions such as the traditional concept of the 
balance of power, but whatever form they take, constructivists argue that these structures and 
actors are “mutually constituted,” and seek to understand how the structure and the actor are 
reproduced in action. The actions would have no meaning without norms to guide their 
understanding of others and of situations. 18  
According to Christiansen and Jørgensen,  
“…the rules, norms and patterns of behaviour that govern social interaction…are 
structures, which are on the one hand, subject to change if and when the practices of actors 
changes, but on the other hand structure political life as actors re-produce them in everyday 
actions.”19 
Constructivism sees these norms as being constitutive to actor identity and interests as actors 
and institutions interact, not just as regulators of behaviour. This is in marked contrast to the 
traditional neorealist and neo-liberal rational approaches to interaction, in which behaviour is 
recognized as being altered, but identities and interests remain unchanged. 20 Jeffery Checkel 
attempted to link these two approaches, suggesting that alone, each is incomplete – a full 
account of the role of norms in both constituting interests and constraining behaviour requires 
a balance of both views.21  
2.2.1 Constructivism and the EU 
A constructivist approach is arguably particularly suited to studies of the European Union‟s 
international role as traditional, rationalist international relations theories struggle to account 
for the sui generis and constantly evolving nature of the EU, as Thomas Christiansen argued, 
                                                 
18 Ted Hopf, ""The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. "" International Security 23, 
no. 1 (1998). 
19 Cited in Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, 172. 
20 Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," 327-8, Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is 
What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 
(1992): 391-2. 
21 Jeffrey C. Checkel, "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist/Constructivist 
Divide," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 4 (1997). 
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stating that the emerging reality of post-territorial, multi-level governance in Europe cannot 
be captured by conventional concepts.22 In contrast to traditional approaches, constructivism 
recognises the dual role of institutions as being constructed by actors and in turn altering and 
constituting the interests of the actors involved. While rationalist schools of thought assume a 
single fixed identity, that of the self-interested state, constructivism sees the possibility of 
multiple identities, considering them and ideas as dynamic, central to interaction and 
therefore to understanding international affairs. Constructivism argues that neglecting to 
study identity ignores the “nature and definition” of actors, which are fundamental to 
international politics.23  This emphasis on identity, and by implication, perception, allows for 
a far deeper understanding of actor behaviour than through a rationalist lens. Inspired by 
idealist social theory, Alexander Wendt argued that people act towards objects based on the 
meaning they associate with that object, using the example that people behave differently 
towards friends than towards enemies.24 This adds another layer to analysis of actor 
behaviour – constructivism allows researchers to take their analyses beyond tangible, material 
interest by examining the intangible. 
For this reason constructivism appears to offer a viable conceptual framework within which 
to explore environmental cooperation and thus the EU-New Zealand relationship on 
environment. As Robyn Eckersley points out, the transboundary nature of many 
environmental issues facing states and the international community, and the cooperation 
necessary to resolve them, is fundamentally at odds with the traditional Westphalian state 
system.25 Increasingly, states are asked to sign up to agreements and policies that may have a 
negative effect on traditional material interests. If doing so might run against these material 
                                                 
22Cited in Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, 173-4. 
23 Hopf, ""The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. "". 
24 Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 396-7. 
25 Robyn Eckersley, "The Strange Neglect of Normative International Relations Theory: Environmental Political 
Theory and the Next Frontier," in Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association (Portland, 
Oregon: 2004), 3. 
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interests, how can the adoption of such measures be explained? A constructivist approach 
which accounts for the impact of norms may be a viable solution to this question, one which 
acknowledges that actor behaviour is often more complex and unpredictable than a traditional 
focus on material interests might indicate. 
2.2.2 Constructivism, Norms and Normative Power 
Constructivism, with its emphasis on norms and the logic of appropriateness, acknowledges 
ideas as a form of power by placing emphasis on both material and ideological forms of 
power in interpreting international relations.26 Within the constructivist school in 
international relations studies, norms theory deals specifically with norms and their diffusion 
at an international level, and in which they are defined as standards of appropriate behaviour 
for actors with a given identity. They imply „a quality of oughtness‟ and provide a 
considerable empirical challenge to researchers as evidence is always indirect.27 
In constructivist norms theory, actors observe norms because they become part of how the 
actor sees itself, not because it would be otherwise coerced, and observation of a norm fulfils 
the actor‟s self-perception as a „good‟ member of the international community.28 This is an 
important distinction, as a rationalist viewpoint recognises norms as constraining behaviour, 
but not as being internalised and constituting identity. However, in Ian Manners‟ view of 
normative power, it is considered possible for normative power to be exercised through 
„carrot and stick‟ means in its agreements with third parties, in particular where aid or 
assistance is tied to expectations of adherence to EU normative values. 
Martha Finnemore, taking a sociological approach to norms, demonstrated with norms theory 
that ideas at the domestic level (in this case the EU level) can be constitutive of international 
                                                 
26 Hopf, ""The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. "". 
27 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 891-2. 
28 Epstein, "The Making of Global Environmental Norms: Endangered Species Protection," 33. 
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institutions, which may then be reflected in third states.29 This idea is also represented in 
Manners‟ diffusion of normative power. At a domestic EU level, studies of the 
Europeanisation of environmental standards have demonstrated that norms emerge through a 
“process of learning and diffusion in supranational institutions.”30 
Within the constructivist school, norms theory deals specifically with norms and their 
diffusion at an international level. Studying norms allows for a dynamic view of the 
international system; as Finnemore and Sikkink argued, the concept of actors following a 
“logic of appropriateness” neglects to account for how the norms involved in this logic can 
change.31  They proposed a norm „life cycle‟ in which the first stage of norm emergence sees 
norm entrepreneurs “frame” the issue and advocate in favour of adoption of a particular 
norm. Once a tipping point is reached at which a “critical mass” of entrepreneurs adopt the 
norm, the second stage occurs as the norm “cascades” throughout the international 
community as norm observers socialize other actors to adopt the norm. The final stage of 
internalisation of the norm is reached once the norm is observed by many actors as a matter 
of course and is no longer questioned.32 
Normative power and constructivist norms theory share common themes and a common 
focus on norms and their spread. Where normative power differs is in its specific application 
to studies of the EU. While Finnemore‟s norms theory deals with the promotion of norms at 
the international level, and treats their spread as a process with several stages, Manners‟ 
normative power deals with motivation and diffusion, attempting to account for why and how 
the EU might appear as a “norm entrepreneur” in its international role. 
                                                 
29 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1996), 2. Cited in John Barkdull and Paul G. Harris, "Environmental Change and Foreign Policy: A Survey of 
Theory," Global Environmental Politics 2, no. 2 (2002): 73. 
30 Antje Wiener, "Constructivism and Sociological Institutionalism," in Palgrave Advances in European Union 
Studies, ed. Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 39. 
31 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 888. 
32 Ibid.: 895-98. 
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2.2.4 The European Union and Normative Power 
The concept of normative power seeks to understand how and why the EU contributes to the 
spread of particular norms in the international system. It is a concept subject to debate, but 
observations of the EU‟s external action with regard to human rights, democracy and its use 
of conditionality would all appear to indicate that something other than the pursuit of pure 
self-interest is at work in certain policy areas and interactions. Further, the way that third 
states respond and adapt their domestic policy and preferences in interaction with the EU 
could demonstrate the effects of socialisation. 
The first suggestion of the EU as a superpower based on merits other than military appeared 
in the writings of François Duchêne. Duchêne conceived of the future EU as a „civilian 
power,‟ spreading norms on the basis of an “ethics of responsibility” through economic 
might, which he saw as an alternative path for the European Community (EC) as opposed to a 
traditional power founded on military might. The development of the EC into a military 
superpower was a prospect which he considered neither feasible nor necessary.33  
Almost two decades later, Joseph Nye presented the concept of „soft power‟ in his work on 
the international position of the United States. He argued, as had Duchêne, that the traditional 
realist concept of power founded on military capability was not the only kind of valid and 
effective power in contemporary international relations. He presented „soft‟ power as a 
contrast to the traditional “directive/command” method of encouraging changes in other 
state‟s behaviour enforced through either punitive or incentive measures, in that is tied to 
“intangible resources such as culture, ideology and institutions.”34 Although this was not 
written with the EU in mind, it certainly laid the foundations for later studies of the EU‟s 
                                                 
33 François Duchêne, "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence," in A Nation Writ 
Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community, ed. Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager 
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34 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 
Joseph Nye, "Soft Power," Foreign Policy, no. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (1990). 
24 
 
international role and future concepts of the EU as a non-traditional normative power or 
superpower. 
Ian Manners elaborated on Duchêne‟s work in 2002 when he described the EU as a 
„normative power‟ in his study of the EU‟s international position on the death penalty. His 
case study illustrated the EU deliberately acting internationally on a normative basis, seeking 
to change state behaviour according to its domestic norms and values out of altruism and a 
belief that its action is positive. While Nye‟s depiction of soft power did not go as far as 
suggesting that this power was exercised deliberately as a planned policy initiative, Manners 
emphasised the deliberate nature of EU international action that actively seeks to change 
international norms to reflect its own values. He saw it as power over opinion, or ideological 
power, and outlined six ways in which these norms may be diffused. They are: contagion, 
described as unintentional diffusion to other political actors; informational, being diffusion as 
a result of strategic communications; procedural, in which diffusion occurs via the 
institutionalisation of a relationship with a third party; transference, which occurs when the 
EU enters into arrangements with third parties for the transfer of goods or aid; overt 
diffusion, generated by the physical presence of the EU in third countries; and finally, 
cultural filter, which accounts for the impact of international norms and learning on third 
parties and institutions. 
Manners rejected the suggestion that this depiction of EU action constituted a sort of „cultural 
imperialism‟ on the basis that the EU often finds itself at odds with other powerful states in 
pursuing its norms internationally.35  This would seem to indicate that the EU pursues 
particular norms even when it may not be in its interests (in traditional terms) to do so.  
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According to Manners, the character of normative EU power can be summed up as follows: 
“The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU 
constructed on a normative basis, but importantly this predisposes it to act in a normative 
way in world politics. It is built on the crucial, but usually overlooked observation, that the 
most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what is 
says, but what it is.”36 
The very existence of the EU demonstrates that the pooling of sovereignty and the emphasis 
on values such as human rights, among other things, can in fact be made a reality and 
considered „normal.‟ Although the values central to the EU and enshrined in legal documents 
are not unique to the EU, the way in which those values have been adopted as foundations of 
foreign policy is perhaps unusual.37 This ability to shape ideas about what is normal is at the 
heart of the normative power concept.38  
2.2.5 Criticism of Normative Power 
Manners‟ description of the EU‟s normative impact in the international arena has been 
debated in a variety of contexts and applied to a number of case studies, most notably in the 
field of human rights,39 and in relation to changes effected in candidate countries in response 
to EU accession requirements.40 As a concept it has been criticized for not being reflexive 
enough – according to Thomas Diez, claims about the spread of EU norms and the EU as a 
„force for good‟ risk becoming „self-righteous and messianistic,‟ if researchers do not take 
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care to thoroughly question and deconstruct the concept and its application to reality.41 
Crucially, a further point made by Diez is that normative power must be able to be 
demonstrated to stand on its own as an independent category of power in order to be valid – it 
cannot be „reducible‟ to economic or military power.42 In the case of EU-New Zealand 
relations, in which economic and trade questions are at the heart of the relationship, this test 
may prove the downfall of the normative power concept. 
Helene Sjursen highlighted the difficulty in finding a consistent definition of normative 
power, finding it presented variously as „civilised‟, „civilising‟ or „ethical‟ power, with 
different claims associated to it. As an example, some scholars equate norms with standards, 
and normative power with the ability to set international standards and regulations. Zaki Laïdi 
for instance, discussed EU economic weight as making its normative power and norms more 
“compelling”, citing a number of European regulations and programmes which are being 
adopted by other actors due to the global economic influence of the EU.43 Recalling Diez‟s 
critique, that normative power must stand on its own to be valid, to conflate norms with 
standards and normative power with economic power to does little to advance the concept. 
Sjursen also asked how we can evaluate whether the EU acts as a „force for good‟, and 
whether normative power is a good thing. Otherwise, she argued, what separates „normative 
power‟ from “Eurocentric imperialism?”44 She also pointed out that many states pursue 
foreign policy based on particular values and norms; in particular, the EU is often presented 
as a normative power in contrast to the United States (US), though US foreign policy could 
also be said to be driven by domestic norms and values with strong moral connotations. What 
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makes the EU different?45 However, it is important to remember Manners‟ argument that the 
EU is a normative power by virtue of what it is; the fact that it exists as a structure of 
governance unlike anything seen before, defying traditional realist views of state behaviour, 
is what makes the EU different to other international actors and what gives it normative 
power and weight. 
Adrian Hyde-Pierce offered a realist critique of normative power, arguing that it is “explicitly 
normative in that it regards normative power as a good thing” and that researchers of the 
concept will have difficulty achieving objectivity, as he suggested that they hold an already 
idealized view of the EU based on the concept of normative power.46 Manners responded to 
these challenges by pointing out that “it is one thing to say that the EU is a normative power 
by virtue of its hybrid polity…it is another to argue that the EU acts in a normative (i.e. 
ethically good) way.”47 The basic concept of normative power does not, and should not seek 
to judge the norms that the EU allegedly disseminates, but to explain and understand aspects 
of EU behaviour that other conceptual frameworks cannot account for. Criticisms of the 
concept such as this are useful in ensuring care is taken not to conflate normative power with 
a moral judgment as to the value of the norms the EU seeks to spread. Antje Wiener explored 
normative power and norms in relation to terrorist threats, and while sympathetic to the idea 
of normative power Europe, she cautioned against the assumption of shared values and norms 
and the expectation that these may be deliberately diffused towards „other‟ contexts. She 
cited her own recent research that found increased diversity of interpretation of the meaning 
of fundamental norms such as democracy, human rights, citizenship and the rule of law 
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among different arenas of the EU, rather than harmonization, arguing that surely norms must 
be shared within the EU before being exported. 48 
Hyde-Price also posited that the member states will only allow the EU to act normatively on 
their behalf as long as it does not conflict with their national interests, leading to hypocrisy 
and conceptual limitations, citing the examples of arms sales to China or economic relations 
with Russia under Vladimir Putin as evidence of this.49. This accusation however implies that 
normative power ought to always be enforced with a stick, and that immediate normative 
change is demanded by the EU. This would seem fundamentally opposed to the idea of 
normative power as proposed by Manners; that is, that the EU pursues and promotes norms 
through ideological power, that it has the ability to do so, and that in some cases it succeeds 
in altering the identities and interests of third parties. It is true that it has attached 
conditionality to agreements with third states, in particular aid agreements, in reference to 
human rights and democratic values. However, to quote Manners, “the long-term diffusion of 
ideas in a normatively sustainable way works like water on stone, not like napalm in the 
morning.”50 
Despite the normative power concept playing a prominent role in debate over the EU‟s 
international role, it has been applied in relatively few studies of the EU‟s role in the 
international environmental arena.  
2.2.6 EU Normative Power and the Environment 
The concept of EU normative power has been applied to some recent studies of the EU‟s role 
in international environmental politics, which has been described as being a leader, in 
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particular in the case of the establishment of the international climate change regime.51 Most 
of these studies have focused either on the EU‟s supposed normative role in the context of 
international environmental regimes and negotiations, in the context of enlargement, or in a 
specific subfield of environmental policy.52  
The concept would seem to be highly suitable for studying the EU‟s role in environmental 
politics based on a number of factors: first, the EU has gained a reputation as leader in 
climate change politics relatively rapidly, based on its performance in the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations, its self-imposed domestic targets and in particular in opposition to the US‟s 
obstructing role, all of which might suggest a depiction of the EU as a standard-setter and a 
normative force in this area; second, in recent years environmental issues, particularly climate 
change, have risen rapidly in public opinion and thus have gained increasing prominence on 
the political agenda internationally, resulting in a growth in environmental rhetoric, 
agreements and policies; third, sustainable development was identified by Ian Manners as one 
of the four „minor norms‟ at the core of EU policy and actively promoted in its international 
interactions.53 
Vogler argued in reference to Manners that the EU‟s role as a disseminator of norms will be 
of long-term significance to the global environmental governance.54 
Scheipers and Sicurelli55 examined the EU‟s contribution to the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the development of an EU „identity‟ in relation to the protocol, as one of two 
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case studies to test the credibility of depictions of the EU as a normative power, the other 
examining the EU role in establishing the International Criminal Court. Refering to Keohane, 
they point out that “while policies that require military action tend to divide Europe, human 
rights and the protection of the environment provide the EU with grounds for reinforcing its 
cohesion and emphasizing its moral role in international relations."56 They argued that EU 
identity on this issue was solidified particularly in reference to an „other‟, in this case the 
United States, and their study found that throughout the Kyoto process the EU promoted 
itself as a supporter of multilateralism and international law, and as a promoter of universal 
values. They stated that the rhetoric used highlighted the EU commitment to consolidating its 
normative leadership, and concluded that the case study supports claims of an EU normative 
identity which, in this case study, was constructed in reference to the US as „other.‟ Scheipers 
and Sicurelli do not make claims as to the validity of representations of the EU as a “green” 
normative power in general, only in relation to the specific case of Kyoto. The concept has 
spread beyond the bounds of academia and has been adopted and even embraced by policy 
officials. José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission made the following 
observations on normative power and the EU‟s role in the climate change regime in a 2007 
interview: 
“In terms of normative power, I broadly agree: we are one of the most important, if not the 
most important, normative power in the world…There is not any group of countries in the 
world that have the same degree of homogeneity. And it is not only the member states but 
also the candidate states - so it is a kind of projecting influence in the „near abroad.‟ Look 
at climate change. We are the ones who are setting the benchmark…Why is that? It is 
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because we have been successful in establishing norms and applying them to different 
realities. ”57 
However, the idea of normative power as applied to the EU in international environmental 
politics also has its critics. Robert Falkner examined the notion of the EU as a “green” 
normative power in the field of biosafety regulation, and found that an interpretation of the 
EU as a normative power promoting the “global good over and above the national interest” 
leads to an incomplete picture of the various factors influencing EU environmental policy and 
foreign policy. He claimed that a normative view of EU international environmental policy, 
such as that supported in the case of Kyoto by Scheipers and Sicurelli, fails to account for the 
role of domestic political and economic factors, and refuted the notion of the EU as a “green” 
normative power based on this case study, preferring a political economy framework. 58 
However, as a policy area the „environment‟ is incredibly broad, with implications for, and 
close links to, a range of other sectors. It needs to be acknowledged that a single case study in 
one environmental policy area does not necessarily reflect the nature of the EUs role in 
environmental politics in general. It may be that the EU can be considered a normative force 
in one area, for example in climate change negotiations as Scheipers and Sicurelli claim, and 
not necessarily in another, as Falkner argued is the case in biosafety regulation.  
2.2.7 Summary  
The concept of normative power, as defined by Manners and related to both Duchêne‟s 
civilian power and Nye‟s soft power, has played an important role in the ongoing question of 
how exactly to define the phenomenon that is the EU. It has been applied as an explanation 
for EU action in a number of areas, most frequently it would seem in relation to human 
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rights. With specific reference to the environment, it has been raised by Scheipers and 
Sicurelli as a possible explanation for the EU‟s leadership role in the international climate 
change regime, but has also been disputed by Falkner in a case study of biosafety regulation. 
This thesis examines the role of the EU in the international environmental arena and 
questions depictions of the EU as a “green” normative power. To establish whether the EU 
exercises a normative role, as defined by Manners, on environmental issues at a global level, 
the thesis analyses the relationship between the EU and a specific third state – New Zealand, 
to find evidence of the EU „diffusing‟ its environmental preferences and norms to New 
Zealand directly or via international institutions. Rather than examine the EU‟s effect through 
a particular international regime or within a specific policy area, the case of relations with a 
third state has been chosen in order to encompass a range of policy areas and gain a broad 
picture of the relationship.  
A first case study narrows the focus further by examining the specific relations between the 
EU and New Zealand on climate change issues. This area has been chosen as it has enjoyed 
an increasingly high political profile throughout the timeframe to be studied (since 1991), and 
the EU‟s alleged rise to a leadership role on the issue coincides with this timeframe, allowing 
the observation of any associated changes in the dynamics of EU-New Zealand relations. 
Because of the high degree of activity in this policy area it is most likely to yield enough data 
to be assessed credibly. The potential pitfalls illustrated above in Falkner‟s study, as well as 
those posed by the highly political nature of climate change issues, will be overcome by 
balancing this narrow case study with the broader, more generalized study of the relationship 
between the two actors. In doing so, it will contribute to studies of the EU‟s unique role in 
international environmental politics on a bilateral as well as multilateral level, and the current 
gap in the literature on the EU‟s normative effect on third states, outside of an 
enlargement/candidate state relationship, in the environmental arena.  
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Further, criticism of the concept as a hypocritical and self-righteous view is often based on 
interpretations of normative power as equivalent to „ethical‟ or „civilising‟ power. The 
approach of this thesis is to interpret „normative power‟ simply as the ability to export EU 
norms, whether expressly or not. No judgment is intended as to the moral value of those 
norms or the intentions of the EU. As Martha Finnemore points out, from the perspective of 
those promoting a norm, the norm always has value, or is „good.‟59 The value of a norm, and 
by extension, the value of normative power, is therefore relative. Sjursen asks “How can we 
know if acting as a normative power is a good thing?” That is not a question that this thesis 
seeks to answer in relation to normative power, only that of “Does the EU exercise normative 
power in its relations with New Zealand on environment?” 
2.3 A Policy Approach 
A policy-based approach shares similar elements to constructivism – both frameworks deal 
with the spread of ideas. Constructivism and normative power takes a relatively broad, 
abstract interpretation of the concept of ideas and focuses on the spread of values or norms, 
while policy studies focus more specifically on ideas in the form of policies. However, unlike 
constructivism, policy studies emphasises material interests when explaining actor behaviour.  
Within policy studies there are a number of closely related approaches that seek to account 
for policy change and the spread of ideas and knowledge, such as policy diffusion, policy 
convergence, learning and policy transfer. The differences between these terms are not 
always clear, and precise definitions for each are difficult to find.  
Diffusion is defined by Elkins and Simmons as being „characterized by interdependent, but 
uncoordinated, decision making‟ where „governments are independent in the sense that they 
make their own decisions without cooperation or coercion but interdependent in the sense 
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that they factor in the choices of other governments.‟60 It is sometimes considered as „agent-
less‟ as, unlike policy transfer, it does not emphasise the actual process of transfer or the 
agents involved.61 Eyestone described policy diffusion as representing either the “spread of 
necessity” or the “emulation of virtue,”62 either of which might explain the dynamics of the 
relationship between the EU and New Zealand on environmental issues. However, tracing the 
origin of a policy is a challenging task as ideas, problems and solutions can all become 
fashionable and become subject to „trends.‟ These ideas have been termed „policy viruses,‟ 
and can spread via complex networks of individual members of „policy communities‟ as they 
interact with their international counterparts.63 
Whereas the term policy diffusion generally refers to multiple cases of policy change or 
emulation stemming from a single source, the term policy transfer relates to specific, unique 
instances of this process. It can therefore be considered a specific sub-field within the broader 
context of policy diffusion. 
Convergence takes policy similarities across multiple actors as its starting point and explores 
the reasons for this, whether these similarities have arisen independently due to comparable 
domestic problems or whether it is the result of policy diffusion.  
Learning is the act of drawing lessons from one jurisdiction or context, whether they are 
positive or negative lessons, and applying them in another. Learning can thus also be 
considered as one type of voluntary policy transfer. As Rose explains, lessons are more 
specific than shifts in thinking, such as the „green‟ revolution in which environmental issues 
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became politicised and environmental regulation and law-making proliferated rapidly. He 
distinguishes lesson-drawing from diffusion by explaining that while diffusion studies 
concentrate on the process, lesson drawing, and indeed policy transfer, focuses on what is 
transferred and why by analysing the decision making process leading to adoption.64 
What is clear is that these policy approaches share a fundamental understanding of the world 
in a globalised context, in which in addition to greater economic interdependence, 
information, institutions and ideas are increasingly spread “horizontally”65 through a variety 
of channels and for many different reasons. They also share a belief in the importance 
influence of the decisions taken by other actors, as more and more actors look outside of their 
own jurisdiction for possible solutions to domestic questions or problems, and emphasise the 
roles of elite individuals and networks (described by Haas as epistemic communities) as an 
important influence in the spread of ideas. They all seek to understand the process in which 
ideas in one context influence change in another.66 A basic assumption of these approaches to 
policy change is that actors prefer to rely on information that is already available to them, and 
therefore in the process of searching for a solution to a problem, will look to policies that 
already exist and have already been tried and tested in another context, to starting from 
scratch.67 
2.3.1 Policy Transfer 
Policy transfer is defined by Dolowitz and Marsh as “the process by which knowledge about 
how policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past 
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or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in another political setting.” 68 It is closely related to studies described above of 
policy diffusion, convergence and learning.  
They identified six key questions as a framework for analysis:  
 Why do actors engage in policy transfer?  
 Who are the key actors?  
 What is transferred? 
 From where are lessons drawn?  
 What are the different degrees of transfer?  
 What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process and how is the process of 
policy transfer related to policy “success” or policy “failure”?69  
Dolowitz and Marsh also distinguished between voluntary transfer, direct coercive transfer 
and indirect coercive transfer of policy. Voluntary transfer occurs when a government 
actively seeks to improve existing policy or to adopt new policy and looks to the examples set 
by other governments.70 Once suitable examples are identified in the policy search process, 
lesson-drawing or policy learning can occur, as a particular kind of voluntary policy transfer. 
Direct coercive transfer occurs when a government is forced to accept a policy by a 
supranational organization, while indirect coercive transfer is the result of “externalities, or 
functional interdependence.” Some of the „push‟ factors they identified included pressure 
generated by advances in technology, economic pressures, and emergence of an international 
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consensus, in the face of which governments who form the exception to the consensus will be 
pressured into conforming. 71  
In terms of applying these concepts however, Dolowitz and Marsh suggest that it is best to 
think of policy transfer as occurring along a continuum, rather than classifying cases of 
transfer as either strictly voluntary or obligated; this would over-simplify what is in fact a 
complex and subtle process. For example, if an EU member state is obligated to adopt an EU 
policy, can this be considered coercive transfer given that states voluntarily join the EU and 
contribute to the formulation of EU policies? At one end of the continuum is voluntary 
lesson-drawing, in which an actor rationally searches for a solution to a domestic problem. At 
the other end are obligated and coercive transfers, in which a policy is imposed by one actor 
on another.72 Thinking of transfer as occurring in this context aids researchers in 
understanding not only what exactly is transferred, but also why it is transferred, and what 
motivates the actors involved. 
Of these possibilities, direct coercive transfer or conditionality is inapplicable to the case 
study of this thesis, leaving voluntary (lesson-drawing) and indirect coercive transfer as 
possible policy transfer modes in the EU-New Zealand relationship. In particular, the possible 
„push‟ factors Dolowitz and Marsh identify in the latter case of economic pressure and 
international consensus are relevant to this case study.  
Further, Dolowitz and Marsh adapt earlier work by Richard Rose73 to explain that there are 
different degrees of transfer: copying is direct and complete transfer of a policy; there is also 
emulation in which the fundamental ideas of a particular policy are transferred; combinations 
in which a range of policies are transferred; and finally, inspiration, in which a policy change 
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or development may be inspired by developments in another jurisdiction, although the end 
result may be quite different.74 
2.3.2 Environmental Policy Transfer  
Damro and Méndes explored a case of environmental policy transfer between the US and the 
EU, in which the EU changed position in the course of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and 
adopted international emissions trading as a policy tool to counter climate change. This was a 
significant change in position, as the concept of market-based mechanisms to reduce 
emissions and free-market environmentalism as espoused by the US ran counter to 
fundamental EU preferences for a precautionary approach, regulation and binding 
commitments. Damro and Méndes saw this change as a voluntary process driven by necessity 
and influenced by EU domestic political and economic factors.75 
In a study particularly relevant to this thesis, Drezner examined the closely related concept of 
policy convergence using environmental protection regulation as one of two case studies and 
found that a neoliberal approach best accounts for the spread of environmental regulation 
when compared with world society (constructivist) and elite consensus (epistemic 
communities) approaches. In a constructivist framework, policy convergence would be driven 
by state identities and the spread of ideas, while a neoliberal framework explains convergence 
through “the number of actors, the power of international organizations, the power of 
international organizations, the amount of available information, and how much convergence 
has distributional consequences.”76 
                                                 
74 Dolowitz and Marsh, "Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making," 
13. 
75 Damro and Méndes, "Emissions Trading at Kyoto: From EU Resistance to Union Innovation." 
76 Daniel W. Drezner, "Globalisation and Policy Convergence," International Studies Review 3, no. 1 (2001): 
74. 
39 
 
Of particular relevance to studies of environmental policy and regulation, Drezner addresses 
the so-called „race to the bottom‟ in which higher costs of production (stemming, for 
example, from more stringent environmental regulation) causes relocation to countries with 
lower costs, and usually lower standards. This argument, that strong environmental regulation 
and policy can reduce economic competitiveness, is often cited in debate on the adoption of 
environmental measures and policy, and is therefore especially pertinent to this thesis. 
According to this theory, states fearing capital flight are obliged to lower their own standards 
in order to remain competitive. Drezner pointed out that this concept ignores the influence of 
constituencies other than industry and capital. Also, it fails to account for entities with global 
economic power, such as the European Union, which arguably have the economic might to 
set higher standards without losing capital.77 He further argued that there is no empirical 
evidence to support the assumption, citing the conclusions of an OECD report which found 
that “the strongest finding shows a positive correlation between successfully sustained trade 
reforms and improvements in core standards.”78 
2.3.4 Small State Theory 
In order to place policy transfer within the wider context of EU-NZ relations and gain a 
deeper understanding of the context within which the policy transfer takes place, small state 
theory provides a useful framework. As a subfield of foreign policy analysis, small state 
theory, also sometimes called weak state theory, takes an international political economy 
approach to understanding state interests and motivations. In contrast to social 
constructivism, it focuses on material motivations of actor behaviour and a neorealist 
interpretation of power and the international system. Small states are assumed to be more 
vulnerable to international competition and fluctuations in markets, and to make decisions 
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and act according to these circumstances – their behaviour is subject to structural 
constraints.79  
Small state theory attempts to provide a specific approach to the particular needs of small 
states, for which there is no precise, commonly accepted definition. Following the 
decolonisation process after World War II, the number of independent states proliferated. 
East noted in 1976 that scholars have long taken as a given that foreign policy is affected by 
physical factors such as population size and geography.80. But what criteria ought to be 
applied in attempting to define a small state? Population size, land area and Gross National 
Product (GNP) are three material measures that are consistently cited, though there is 
extensive debate as to what limitations and weightings should be accorded to each of these. 
According to Björn Ólafsson in his case study of Iceland as a small state, population as a 
measure of size is the most important criteria, to be followed by land area and GNP. He 
argues that the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) should be included in the measure of land 
area, as this may substantially increase a state‟s available resources while also increasing its 
administrative costs.81 Other researchers have included measures such as military 
capability.82 Ólafsson cites researcher Bilal Jaman, who created an index by size of 111 
countries and suggested that a small state is one with a population less than 5 million, an area 
smaller than 250,000km2, and a GNP of less than US $3 billion.83 New Zealand is close to 
these criteria in terms of population and land area: its total land mass is approximately 
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268,000km284 and its total population 4.27 million (in June 2008). 85 In terms of GNP, New 
Zealand‟s figure is considerably higher than the figure suggested by Jaman, as in 2005 its 
GNP per capita rank in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) was 21.86 However, there is no consensus as to what the physical, 
demographic and economic criteria of a small state should be; indeed, Jeanne Hey argues that 
a general concept is preferable to attempting to arrive at a concrete definition of what 
physically constitutes a small state, suggesting that some flexibility is needed.87 A number of 
studies have successfully applied small state theory to the case of New Zealand, including 
Salvatore, cited by Richard Thornton, who determined New Zealand to be a “very small high 
income state.”88 
Beyond simply classifying what material characteristics are needed to qualify as a small state, 
a number of particular characteristics of small state behaviour in international affairs were 
identified and classified by John Henderson, based on earlier work by Maurice East: 
1) A comparatively low level of participation in world affairs: due to limited resources, 
small states cannot match the budgets and resources of large states when it comes to 
maintaining diplomatic representation overseas. 
2) Narrow focus in international affairs: also due to limited resources, it is necessary for 
small states to focus their involvement on issues of particular relevance. 
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3) Strong focus on trade and economic matters: this is in order to maximize benefits 
from limited resources. Small states are dependent on export revenue and vulnerable 
to international market forces. 
4) Internationalism/multilateralism: small states rely on international law and institutions 
to advance and protect their interests, as they lack the political/economic might to 
influence large states independently. 
5) Emphasis on morals: Because small states lack resources, their use of moral rhetoric 
is generally not threatening to large states. They support international legal norms. 
6) Caution: This overlaps with the previous characteristic, and is a relatively 
controversial point, subject to debate. Small states may take particular care to avoid 
alienating important partners.89 
Small state theory is particularly applicable in the context of the New Zealand- European 
Union relationship. New Zealand is the substantially smaller partner in this context and 
therefore is expected to display the characteristic behaviour of a small state. 
2.3.5 Summary 
A policy approach is based in rationalism and emphasises material influences on actor 
behaviour. Unlike a constructivist approach, in which ideas and identities are central to 
explanations of actor behaviour and agents and structures are mutually constitutive, a policy 
approach assumes a realist interpretation of the international system, which places power, 
security and material interest squarely at the heart of actor decision making. Specifically, a 
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policy transfer approach examines actor motivation and decision-making processes involved 
in the domestic development of policy.  
Small state theory provides a suitable framework to understand the broader international 
context of EU-New Zealand relations within which policy transfer occurs. In contrast to a 
constructivist approach, small state theory takes a rationalist stance and links state behaviour 
to material resources and interests, consistent with a policy approach. 
In contrasting a policy approach with a constructivist approach, the thesis asks what ideas are 
shared or exchanged in the context of this particular case study: Are ideas in the form of 
norms and values exchanged, and if so, is this EU normative power at work? Alternatively, 
does the exchange of ideas occur in the form of policies, and if so, what does this indicate 
about the nature of the relationship?  
2.4 Chapter Summary 
As previously highlighted, one of the most frequent criticisms of normative power, and 
norms theory in general, is that it is empirically challenging, to say the least. How can such 
abstract notions as norms be credibly tested, measured and accounted for? How can 
normative power be proven, or disproven?  
This thesis takes as its central hypothesis two assertions by Thomas Diez: firstly, for the 
normative power argument to be credible it must not be able to be reduced to either economic 
or military power; and secondly, that normative power, as the ability to shape conceptions of 
what is normal, should therefore be able to be identified as an impact on what other actors 
believe is appropriate behaviour or action.90 It assumes that if a normative power explanation 
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is applicable to the relationship between the EU and New Zealand on environment, then it 
must be possible to demonstrate that:  
a) The EU can be shown to be engaging in dialogue with New Zealand on environment 
for reasons other than material. That is, it cannot be shown that there are economic or 
political benefits to be gained. 
Even if this can be demonstrated, there can be no power without an impact on a third party. 
The crux of the normative power argument is that the EU influences conceptions of what is 
normal. Therefore it must also be shown that: 
b) New Zealand is engaging in dialogue with the EU on environment for reasons other 
than material.  
More specifically, if it is to be argued that the EU has impacted New Zealand in a normative 
way through their relationship on environment, it would be expected that: 
c) Environmental policies or positions in New Zealand can be shown to have developed 
in line with EU policies or positions, as a result of interaction with the EU and for 
reasons other than material interest. New Zealand‟s conception of „what is normal‟ in 
environmental politics and policy has been influenced by the EU. 
If these conditions cannot be met in the context of this particular case study, then in the 
proposed alternative framework incorporating small state theory and a policy approach, it 
would be anticipated that: 
a) There are material benefits to the EU in engaging in dialogue with New Zealand on 
environment. 
Again, as above, it must also be shown that: 
b) There are material benefits to New Zealand in engaging in dialogue with the EU on 
environment. 
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In this approach, instead of a normative impact on behaviour, the economic impact of the EU 
is evident in the evolution of certain New Zealand environmental policies: 
c) Environmental policies or positions in New Zealand may be shown to have developed 
in line with EU policies or positions for pragmatic reasons related to material 
interests. 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework of the thesis, in which a constructivist 
account of the EU relationship with New Zealand on environmental issues is compared and 
contrasted with a policy transfer explanation, as well as detailing how this framework can be 
applied to the case study in practical terms. In doing so, it explores the validity of 
constructivism and the concept of normative power in the context of the chosen case study, 
the results of which allows conclusions to be drawn about the limits of constructivism as 
applied to the European Union in its global role.  
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3: Environmental Identities and 
Policies 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will briefly introduce the respective domestic environmental „cultures‟ of the EU 
and New Zealand. Political rhetoric often refers to „shared values‟ in the context of New 
Zealand and EU relations. In the context of environmental issues, to what extent is this 
statement valid? An understanding of the domestic contexts within which each party operates 
is necessary in order to better understand their bilateral interaction. 
Read within a constructivist framework, this enables understanding of each actor‟s „identity‟ 
with regard to environmental policy and the importance of perceptions of environment in the 
formulation of policy. 
Within the context of a policy framework, this highlights the institutions and networks that 
provide the structure for domestic environmental policy making. Thus this chapter asks; to 
which actors does New Zealand look when it is developing environmental policy? What are 
the major policy influences? 
Due to space constraints a detailed discussion is not possible, therefore this chapter will only 
give a broad overview of what are indeed complex, detailed topics. It will discuss the policy 
processes involved in the historical development of environmental policy framework within 
each party and give an overview of the respective processes of formulation of environmental 
policy. It will then summarise the international role each party has played in the global 
environmental arena, and finally identify particular characteristics and perceptions that 
impact on these processes, and thus on policy. 
47 
 
3.2 The European Union 
The EU and its predecessor the European Community (EC) have both played a significant 
role in environmental diplomacy, particularly in the last two decades. During this time, its 
internal environmental policy making capability has expanded exponentially and this has 
translated into it taking a more prominent role in international environmental negotiations and 
institutions.  
At its founding, the European Economic Community (EEC) had no formal environmental 
policy. Today, it has one of the strongest and most progressive environmental regimes in the 
world, due to the efforts and influence of a wide variety of state and non-state actors at all 
levels of decision-making and governance, from the supranational institutions of the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), to national and sub-national actors 
such as interests groups, local government and companies.91  
3.2.1 Development of EU Environmental Policy 
EC leaders took the decision at the Paris Summit of 1972 to develop a common 
environmental policy, a decision which reflected a surge in public opinion on environmental 
issues and protection.92 The following year the „Programme of Action of the European 
Communities on the Environment‟ was adopted, establishing eleven principles which would 
underpin EU environmental policy, including „polluter pays‟, prevention, precaution and 
subsidiarity.93 The legal status of the environment in its early years as a community policy 
area was unclear as the founding document of the EEC, the 1957 Treaty of Rome, contained 
                                                 
91 Jenny Fairbrass and Andrew Jordan, "Multi-Level Governance and Environmental Policy," in Multi-Level 
Governance, ed. Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 147. 
92 Albert Weale, "Environmental Rules and Rule-Making in the E.U," in Environmental Policy in the European 
Union, ed. Andrew Jordan (London; Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2005), 127. 
93 European Information Association, Finding out About Environment Policy (European Information 
Association,  2007 [cited February 20 2009]); available from http://www.eia.org.uk/finding/0701-
environment.pdf. 
48 
 
no provisions for Community action on the environment. Instead, policy was initially 
implemented under Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome, regarding the free movement of 
goods.94 As public environmental awareness increased, Member States began to enact 
domestic environmental legislation that threatened to disrupt trade within the European 
internal market.95 Therefore, environment was finally given formal legal status in the Single 
European Act (SEA) of 1987.96  
Once given formal treaty basis in the SEA the environmental acquis expanded rapidly 
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, periods of heightened environmental awareness 
and international environmental law-making.97 At the same time, there was a shift in focus in 
EU policy-making, from a primary concern with domestic member state issues in the 1970s, 
to an increasingly EU level and international focus in the 1980s and 1990s. This shift in 
emphasis was due in part to the emergence of transnational environmental problems, such as 
acid rain and damage to the ozone layer, which challenged traditional responses and 
solutions, and, for the first time, necessitated cross-border cooperation. The European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) played a particularly important role in the growth of environmental policy in 
the EU, siding with the Commission on a number of significant decisions, including 
upholding the principle that the protection of the environment is a legitimate cause for 
restraining trade.98 Policy makers also began to realise that as a wide range of otherwise 
legitimate activities can unintentionally impact negatively on the environment, environmental 
policy needed to be incorporated and fully integrated into a range of other policy areas. The 
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SEA stated in Article 132r(2) that “…environmental protection requirements shall be a 
component of the Community‟s other policies.”99  
In the 1980s, it became increasingly common to promote environmental measures by arguing, 
counter to the traditional view of a necessary trade-off between environmental standards and 
economic interests, that environmental policies would maximise competitiveness in the 
interests of a new, post-industrial economy which upholds high environmental standards.100 
This argument has been a recurring theme in EU international discourse on environment and 
most recently on climate change.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 was a particular turning point in EU environmental policy. 
Changes were made to the preamble and to Article 2, to identify sustainable development as a 
key EU objective to be integrated across policy areas.101 This reflected the development of 
environmental institutions and policy both in the EU and internationally, cementing the place 
of environment as a pivotal policy area in the EU. 
3.2.2. EU Environmental Policy Framework 
Environment now falls under Articles 174 to 176 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC, formerly the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community). 
Currently, EU environmental policy is governed by the Sixth Environment Action 
Programme for the period 2002-2010. The Action programme sets out the overall direction of 
environmental policy and specifies four priority areas of action: climate change; nature and 
biodiversity, environment and health and quality of life, and management of natural resources 
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and waste. 102 As of 2007, the EU allocated almost €7.1 billion annually in funding to 
environmental matters. 103 
The Commission is the primary agenda-setter for environmental policy, and within the 
Commission, DG Environment is the hub of EU environmental policy making. It was first 
established in 1981 as Directorate General XI, responsible for Environment, Nuclear Safety 
and Civil Protection, and is now divided into seven thematic divisions, which are: 
Communication, Legal Affairs & Civil Protection; Protecting the Natural Environment; 
Climate Change & Air; Water, Chemicals & Cohesion; Resources; and Sustainable 
Development & Integration. 
DG Environment policy makers consult with a range of external interest groups and 
institutions. One of these is the European Environment Agency, which was established in 
1990 to protect and improve the environment according to Treaty provisions and the 
Environment Action Programmes.104 Its role is to provide effective environmental monitoring 
information and analyses to the member states and EU institutions to enable effective 
decision making and policy formulation.105 
Non-governmental organisations also play an important and constructive role in the EU, 
pressing issues onto the political agenda and influencing public opinion. Regional, national 
and sub-national interest groups and actors have established direct relationships with EU 
decision makers or with both EU and national level actors where competence is unclear or 
contested.106 Of the environmental interest groups with influence at EU level, seven are 
particularly important. They are the European Environment Bureau (EEB), which has the 
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longest history of formal representation in Brussels, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace 
International, the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Climate Network Europe, the 
European Federation for Transport & Environment, and BirdLife International. All seven act 
both as pressure groups and as think tanks, and use public campaigns and direct contact with 
member governments to influence opinion.107 Although environmental lobbying is not 
unusual to Europe, the level and profile of the European lobby is, in general terms, higher 
than average when compared with other industrialised democracies.108 An MfE Policy 
Adviser commented that the environmental lobby in the EU is particularly strong and many 
of their international positions are driven by domestic politics.109 
Environmental legislation in the EU is most often developed with the co-decision procedure, 
in which legislation is proposed by the European Commission to be approved (or rejected) 
jointly by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The European Commission 
drafts and proposes legislation after consultation with interest groups and relevant parties. It 
will occasionally release Green or White Papers to encourage discussion and gain feedback 
from interested parties.110 The Parliament gives feedback to the Commission, following 
which the Council will adopt a common position. This is then forwarded to the Parliament 
who have a three month period within which they can accept the Council‟s position and thus 
adopt the law; reject the position altogether; or they may make changes to the common 
position, returning it to the Council who then have a three month period within which to 
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act.111 The Council vote on environmental legislation using the Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV) procedure.112  
3.2.2 International Role 
The EU is increasingly perceived both domestically and internationally as a leader in 
environmental issues. In this context, the EU has gradually exchanged roles with the United 
States (US), which was perceived as the international leader throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
in particular for its role in the development of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion 
caused by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other chemicals.113 However, from the late 1980s 
onwards, the EC began to consistently set higher standards in legislation to protect health and 
the environment than corresponding actions in the US, and since then has generally 
strengthened, not weakened, those standards when they have been reviewed or amended. 
During the same period, the US increasingly withdrew from involvement in international 
environmental negotiations and agreements, failing to sign a number of significant 
conventions.114 The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol were the opportunity for the EU to seize 
the international environmental leadership role that the US had abdicated. According to 
Michael Grubb and Joyeeta Gupta, the EU saw and sees itself as the „historical, current and 
future leader‟ in international climate change, having placed increasing emphasis on 
environment and sustainability.115 The Dutch Environment Minister is quoted as saying in 
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1997 “I firmly believe that the world is looking to the EU to play an ambitious role in the 
negotiating process.”116 
Environmental protection has increasingly become an important focus of European foreign 
policy. In areas such as hazardous waste117 and climate change it does appear to hold an 
important leadership role; however, it is criticised as often as it is praised. Recently, 
prominent American climate change campaigner Al Gore commented that he doubted the 
ability of the EU to lead the world on climate change due to a lack of cohesion, instead 
claiming that the US is the only actor capable of such a task.118 Further, the EU‟s external 
reputation is undermined by the negative environmental impact of its Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), which has contributed to the over-use of pesticides by subsidising intensive 
agriculture, and Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), under which EU distant-water fishing fleets 
have controversially negotiated access to fisheries in developing countries. However, it is in 
these very areas that, as Vogler argues, the EU as an economic force could potentially make a 
significant contribution to international environmental governance, by continuing to 
campaign for serious consideration of trade-environment linkages at the WTO.119  
The EU‟s external environmental policy focus is on multilateral action, which is consistent 
with its endorsement of multilateral cooperation in general. It also places emphasis on inter-
regional cooperation, and engages extensively in bilateral interaction, with environment 
clauses inserted into its regional and bilateral deals. These clauses however tend to refer back 
to the EU‟s multilateral priorities as they often call for cooperation in the course of 
multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) negotiations. 120 Vogler argues that this bilateral 
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cooperation utilising the EU‟s diplomatic networks and integrating environment into its 
foreign policy at all levels, is essential to supporting effective multilateral environmental 
regimes.121 He also argued that the EU can be considered a disseminator of norms when 
considering the role of the EU‟s policy ideas and the environmental conditions placed upon 
third parties in various bilateral agreements with the EU, although whether these extend 
beyond rhetoric is largely untested. What is clear, however, is that whatever its motivation, its 
external environmental influence is by no means limited to the environmental acquis that 
candidate countries must adopt.122 
It stands to make a significant impact in climate change policy if its emissions trading 
scheme, which commenced in January 2005 and which covers trading between power 
generators and industrial plants, actually succeeds in lowering EU emissions. Under the first 
phase of the scheme (2005-2007), total emissions grew 0.68%.123 However, entering the 
second phase of the scheme, the Commission tightened caps and reduced allowances. 
Successful emissions reduction would enhance the EU‟s credibility and set the standard for 
future schemes.124 
Who speaks for the EU? 
According to the 1971 ERTA (European Road Transport Agreement) ECJ decision on the 
extent of the Commission‟s external competence,125 external competence flows from internal 
competence. It found that the Commission, having excusive internal competence for a policy 
area, derived „implied‟ external powers from its internal competence. It introduced the 
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concept of „exclusivity‟: namely that it was feasible for the Commission to act alone and sign 
an international agreement on behalf of the member states, without the need for the member 
states to also sign.126 This has resulted in three possibilities for the EU acting in the 
international arena: exclusive competence, mixed competence or member state competence.  
Representation of the EU in international environmental politics can be complicated – it is 
designated as enjoying mixed competence, meaning that external representation can involve 
the Commission, the member states and the commission acting together, or just the member 
states, depending on the specific policy areas involved. Usually, the Commission negotiates 
with a Council mandate, and it is common practice for the Member States to also 
participate.127 As previously indicated, although the Treaty of Rome did not include any 
reference to the environment, from the 1970s onwards the EU‟s domestic environmental 
policy making and international environmental diplomacy increased exponentially, the EC 
acting without explicit legal basis until the SEA in 1987. The ECJ also played an important 
role in enabling external representation of the EU on environmental matters without formal 
treaty basis.128 For third parties, it was particularly challenging initially in that there was no 
precedent for Community negotiations at a multilateral environmental level, and the varied 
competencies and complex legal arrangements were confusing.129 The EU‟s increased 
involvement in protracted environmental negotiations at the multilateral level is a challenge 
for both those representing the EU and those interacting with it. Negotiations can often last 
for several years, while the EU‟s biannually rotating presidency system means that 
momentum is lost and planning strategy is difficult. 130 More recently however, informal 
attempts have been made to overcome the confusion generated by the EU‟s representative 
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arrangements and to maximize efficiency. In the Commission on Sustainable Development, a 
„lead-country approach‟ was adopted, in which work is shared among the member states and 
the Commission, with a „lead-country‟ preparing a policy draft for each agenda item for 
discussion. In addition an „EU-team‟ approach was used in negotiations on biosafety, in 
which the Presidency and the Commission represented the EU.131 
3.2.3 Perceptions of Environment 
Ideas in domestic society such as public opinion can help explain policy and behaviour,132 
and the EU enjoys an especially high level of public concern about and awareness of 
environmental issues, particularly climate change. In addition, the European public and 
industry are accustomed to high standards in environmental regulation and are therefore in 
general relatively willing to accept the need for regulation to meet environmental 
challenges.133 This high public awareness has meant there are relatively high numbers of 
voters for „green‟ parties in some Member States, substantial budgets for environment 
ministries and ready support for environmental policies.134 Environmental interests are as a 
result well represented at national level and in the European Parliament. 
Regular Eurobarometer surveys have been made of public opinion in Europe specifically in 
reference to the environment. When it came to suggesting solutions to environmental 
problems, Europeans showed a preference for stricter legislation coupled with greater fines 
for infringements and for the „polluter pays‟ principle, with less than 10% advocated leaving 
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it to industry and science to offer solutions.135 In 2007, a Eurobarometer on attitudes to 
environment was conducted. It showed that increasingly, Europeans consider the state of the 
environment as having a similar effect on their personal quality of life as economic factors, 
and that they most frequently associate the concept of environment with global issues such as 
climate change (57%). Furthermore, the environmental issues that they are most concerned 
about tended to be global in scope, such as climate change and pollution. The four highest 
ranked environmental concerns from 2004 did not change.136 The survey also found that 
Europeans placed great importance on protecting the environment, with 64% stating that it 
was very important.137 
Generally speaking, European industry takes a cooperative approach to dealing with 
regulation and policy by trying to influence implementation programs at the EU and domestic 
levels, and is generally open to drawing up voluntary agreements.138 Schreurs suggests that 
this is indicative of the influence of social-democratic governance in Europe, in which a more 
cooperative approach is taken on environmental matters, as opposed to, for example, the 
adversarial nature of the relationship between government, nongovernmental organisations 
and industry in the US, according to the US‟ neoliberal ideal of minimal government 
intervention in the economy.139 
References to EU environmental values are frequently made. The conclusions of the 
European Council at Dublin in June 1990 included a declaration on the “Environmental 
Imperative” that advocated a proactive lead role for the European Community (EC) in 
promoting international environmental cooperation and action, which referred to the “special 
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responsibility” of the Community and Member States to take action to combat global 
environmental problems. On global issues, the Council declared that “the Community must 
use more effectively its position of moral, economic and political authority…”140 The 
Council went on to urge states to accede to the Montreal Protocol on substances which 
deplete the ozone layer, and indicated its concern at greenhouse gas emission levels and at 
tropical deforestation rates.141 The declaration highlighted the legal foundations of EC 
obligation to the environment, and the need for action to be of a preventative and 
precautionary nature, the precautionary principle being central to EC environmental policy. It 
illustrates the value placed by the EC (and now the EU) on environment and its emphasis on 
EU responsibility and obligation as an economic power to take action on the international 
stage, making clear that the EU considers it a moral duty to support international responses to 
global problems, as well as a duty to encourage similar behaviour in third states.  
The Precautionary Principle  
The precautionary principle, enshrined first at Maastricht and again in subsequent treaties is 
one of the key principles of European environmental law.142 The principle, the essence of 
which is that where there is risk of harm a lack of scientific evidence should not constrain 
preventative action, has been embraced by the EU in its internal environmental policy-
making and is expressed in the European Community Treaty, which was amended in 1992 to 
expressly include the precautionary principle. It has its roots in German legal tradition143 and 
emerged particularly in the 1980s, as new environmental challenges such as acidification 
arose for which the causes and effects were unclear and the solutions complex and subject to 
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much debate. As a result of this uncertainty, which delayed remedial action, policy makers 
argued for precaution to be taken into account in the formulation of policy.144 It is now firmly 
established in legislation and in case law as a binding principle.145 Article 174(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that “Community policy on the environment shall 
aim at a high level of protection…It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the 
principles that preventative action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a 
priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.” 146 Initially the term was used 
with reference to the protection of public health, but began to be used in Europe in the late 
1970s with regard to protection of the environment. The EU preference for precaution, in 
particular with reference to its stance in biotechnology negotiations, is tied to negative 
experiences and policy failures, such as the Chernobyl meltdown, the outbreak of bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or „mad cow‟) in the United Kingdom, as well as health 
scares in individual member states, such as the AIDS contamination of donated blood in 
France and dioxin contamination of animal feed in Belgium.147  
3.3 New Zealand 
Environmental sustainability is seen as increasingly important to New Zealand‟s national 
identity. New Zealand‟s economy is dominated by enterprises that rely on the environment, 
with the agriculture and tourism sectors being the biggest export earners, therefore 
sustainability is also very important economically. Agriculture and horticulture use over 50% 
of available arable land, while the tourism industry relies on the projection of New Zealand as 
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„clean and green‟ and images of a pristine natural environment to attract international 
visitors.148  
3.3.1 Development of New Zealand Environmental Policy 
As in most other wealthy industrialised countries, public concern for the environment 
increased enormously in the 1970s, and in 1972, New Zealand appointed its first Minister for 
the Environment. The Values Party was one of the first “green‟ political parties in the world 
when it was formed in New Zealand in May 1972.149 
Between 1984 and 1990, the structure of environmental administration in New Zealand 
underwent significant changes, establishing the current framework of environmental 
management.  
Prior to this restructuring, central government was responsible for administration of the 
environment. A system of environmental impact assessment had been established in 1973, 
under the authority of the Commission for the Environment, established the previous year. 
However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, central government increasingly promoted large 
scale, resource intensive projects to stimulate the faltering economy, arguing in favour of 
these “Think Big” projects by promoting them as „in the national interest.‟150 
Obviously, this led to a conflict of interest between the desire for economic growth through 
the exploitation of natural resources and protection of the environment. Many environmental 
groups, highlighting this conflict of interest between the government‟s desire for economic 
growth through exploiting natural resources and its responsibility for environmental 
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protection, demanded that authority be devolved to a regional level, giving communities more 
influence over their immediate environment. This coincided with the wishes of free-market 
reformers, who wanted to replace central government‟s authority to develop resources with 
market forces.151  
The election of the fourth Labour Government in 1984 precipitated a period of radical reform 
across all facets of government, inspired by “New Right” ideology. It was a period of 
extreme upheaval for the economy as well as for New Zealand society. Christoff and Buhrs 
argue that the concentration of executive power in New Zealand, and in particular the role of 
the Treasury, allowed for neo-liberal ideology to gain a strong influence in the politics of the 
day and governments began to withdraw financial support that had previously been given to 
industry development projects, a move that indirectly led to the strengthening of 
environmental institutions as environmental issues were able to be given greater emphasis.152 
Some of these reforms had unintended positive environmental effects; for example the 
government abolished subsidies to farmers for agriculture, which led to a drop in the 
intensive and unsustainable use of farmland.153  
The Environment Act, passed in 1986, established the Ministry for the Environment to 
replace the former Commission for the Environment, and at the same time, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment was established as an independent overseer of the entire 
framework of environmental administration. The following year, the Conservation Act 
established the Department of Conservation to administer and protect publicly owned nature 
reserves. Prior to this, the administrative structure had been unclear and had grown in an ad 
hoc manner, leading to conflicts of interests and confusion. After a clear framework had been 
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established, a comprehensive review of resource management policies and procedures took 
place, resulting in the passing of the Resource Management Act (RMA) in 1991.154 This 
marked a shift in the philosophy of environmental policy in New Zealand. Previously, New 
Zealand policy on environment and development had been characterised by regulation and 
guidelines, and planning. The introduction of the RMA, with its focus on assessing effects 
and outcomes as well as costs and benefits, was a more flexible framework within which to 
operate. At the same time, there was a shift in focus towards a more cooperative approach to 
environmental policy making, including the use of voluntary agreements and growing interest 
in the use of economic instruments to meet environmental challenges.155 It shifted decision-
making on environment and resource management from the central government level to the 
regional council level and to the Environment Court, a move which both green campaigners 
and free-market reformers applauded. The act allows for greater public participation in the 
resource consent process but this does not necessarily correspond to greater influence.156 
Christoff and Bührs argue that these bodies are generally weighted towards development 
interests.157 
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3.3.2 New Zealand Environmental Policy Framework 
Environmental policy in New Zealand has generally been formulated in an ad hoc manner, 
especially where it intersects with other policy areas, and has not always been proactive or 
anticipatory.158 The available example of other developed countries meant New Zealand was 
in an excellent position to develop anticipatory environmental policies. Bartlett and Buhrs 
argue that New Zealand did not take advantage of this position and instead developed a poor 
record in environmental planning, not implementing key legislation until quite late by 
international standards. However, in the 1980s when New Zealand reformed its 
environmental management framework, establishing its key institutions in a radical overhaul 
of the previous system, it also established an international reputation as an innovator in 
environmental policy,159 even though this overhaul was not necessarily motivated primarily 
by environmental concerns but by a broader ideological shift.160  
The Ministry for the Environment (MfE) is the body primarily responsible for the 
development of environmental policy in New Zealand. Within the hierarchy of government 
ministries and agencies, it is not particularly powerful and „lacks teeth‟ when it comes to 
crucial areas such as energy, transport and agriculture,161 relying instead on cooperation with 
relevant Ministries to co-ordinate and integrate policy across government. This is a reflection 
of the fact that MfE has a relatively small role when it comes to the practical implementation 
of environmental policy. The result is that environmental policy has often been ad hoc and 
particularly susceptible to politicisation.162 
The Ministry consults with stakeholders when needed, particularly with Maori groups and 
local iwi. Although there are channels for participation and input, environmental groups have 
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less influence on New Zealand policy than their counterparts in the EU, where environmental 
groups are experienced and influential lobbyists. One policy official commented that local 
environmental non-government organisations (NGOs) tend to take a somewhat adversarial 
approach and that communication primarily takes the form of Official Information Act 
requests.163 However, NGOs have had major successes influencing government 
environmental policy; for example, they played an important role in the decision to remove 
lead additives from petrol in 1984.164 Their influence is growing as lobbying becomes more 
common in New Zealand and better understood as a legitimate democratic activity, and 
groups gain more experience in the practice.165 
The other major government bodies in New Zealand‟s environmental administration 
framework are the Department of Conservation (DOC) and the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment. DOC is charged with policy development and management of publicly 
owned land and nature reserves, which together make up twenty three per cent of New 
Zealand‟s land area, while the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 
who reports directly to Parliament, is to oversee the framework of environmental 
management and recommend changes if necessary.166 
Buhrs argued in 2002 that environment was not seen as central to the functioning of most 
New Zealand government agencies, and was still treated as an “add-on.” He pointed out that 
within the hierarchy of Cabinet, the status of a portfolio is tied to the „rank‟ of the Minister 
responsible. The Minister responsible for the Environment portfolio usually ranks at the low 
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end of this hierarchy.167 A notable exception was that of Geoffrey Palmer, who kept his 
Environment portfolio when he became Prime Minister in 1989. However, sustainability and 
the goal of carbon neutrality became a focus of the fifth Labour government. In 2007, the 
Carbon Neutral Public Service Programme was announced, with the goal of six government 
agencies achieving carbon neutrality by 2012, with twenty-eight other agencies also 
involved.168 
A Treasury policy adviser stated that policy development in New Zealand generally takes an 
inclusive approach with close links between academics, business and government, and that 
policy is mainly driven by domestic influences and values, even international policy.169  
However, in today‟s globalised world, New Zealand‟s environmental policy is also 
influenced by actors from outside the country. A Ministry for the Environment policy official 
stated that the Ministry considers Australia almost as a part of New Zealand, and thus policy 
developments in New Zealand are often closely linked to what might be happening in 
Australia. However, when it comes to best practice, particularly in specific areas like 
chemicals management, the Ministry looks to the EU and what can be learnt from them, as 
well as to the OECD. The official added that there is also a focus on building relationships 
with Asian partners as trading links are further developed in this region.170 
3.3.3 International Role 
New Zealand has played key roles in of a range of major international environmental 
regimes, notably in its strong and outspoken opposition to whaling, its stance on disarmament 
and nuclear weapons, and on the protection of the Antarctic. Buhrs and Christoff argue that 
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this reflects a concern for protection of the immediate neighbourhood rather, than a broader 
„ecocentric‟ approach to global issues.171 
Prime Minister David Lange of the fourth Labour Government barred nuclear powered ships 
and ships carrying nuclear weapons from entering New Zealand‟s ports or territorial waters in 
1984 and in 1985 refused port entry to a US ship on this basis, an act which lead to US 
suspension of its ANZUS obligations and serious and ongoing damage to New Zealand-US 
defence relations.172 Legislation declaring New Zealand as a nuclear-free zone was passed in 
1987 following public outrage over the Rainbow Warrior bombing and ongoing French 
nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific.173 Some argue that it gives extra strength and 
credibility to New Zealand‟s international role, in particular with relation to environmental 
initiatives,174 and it is now a firmly entrenched policy and arguably a cornerstone of New 
Zealand identity.  
New Zealand strongly opposes whaling other than that carried out for subsistence by 
indigenous groups, provided International Whaling Commission (IWC) criteria is met. It 
advocates the creation of whale sanctuaries and supports the moratorium on commercial 
whaling that has been in place since 1986.175 New Zealand‟s opposition to whaling is based 
on a moral and ethical objection to the killing of whales, and a desire to prove definitively 
that whale populations are at robust levels before considering lifting the moratorium. 
Geoffrey Palmer identifies a number of factors that made New Zealand a trusted partner and 
authority in negotiations towards the Montreal Protocol, but which may also apply to 
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international environmental negotiations in general. He notes New Zealand‟s small size, 
making it a non-threatening partner; its dependence on the agricultural/fisheries sector 
although industrialized, as well as its bicultural heritage and close relations with the Pacific 
means it is able to relate well to some developing nations; but he cites as most important New 
Zealand‟s credibility on environmental issues,176 particularly its staunch anti-nuclear and 
anti-whaling stance. 
3.3.4 Perceptions of Environment in New Zealand 
The land played an important role in Pakeha New Zealanders‟ identity construction in 
colonial times, when, in the absence of family networks and historical connections to places, 
connection to the physical environment was defined through land ownership. Maori New 
Zealanders have a particularly important physical and spiritual relationship with the land. A 
1993 study found that New Zealanders‟ self image is centred on landscape and environment, 
as opposed to US self image, for example, which focuses on ideological values and 
politics.177 In the first half of the twentieth century, national parks were established though 
government and conservationist efforts. In the 1970s and 80s, public environmental concern 
was focused on the protection of forests and against logging. From the 1980s onwards, the 
scope of public opinion broadened and global issues began to become increasingly 
prominent, such as whaling, nuclear power, driftnet fishing, rainforest protection and the 
ozone layer.178 Buhrs and Bartlett argue that New Zealand‟s principle strength has been in 
conservation and ecological issues, not in the conservation of resources.179 
During the 1970s and 1980s, public opposition to nuclear power and weapons grew as a 
result of French testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. The bombing of the Rainbow 
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Warrior in 1985 by French secret service agents only served to galvanise public opinion, 
leading to the 1987 Labour Government‟s legislation declaring New Zealand nuclear free. 
Public support for the environmental organisation Greenpeace increased dramatically over 
this time, with Greenpeace New Zealand enjoying the highest per-capita membership rate in 
the world in the late 1980s, as did support for other environmental issues.180  
‘Clean and green’ 
Bartlett and Buhrs argue that New Zealand‟s mantra of „clean and green,‟ promoted by media 
and politicians, and of crucial importance to the tourism industry, has resulted in New 
Zealand lagging behind the rest of the world in terms of environmental management by 
inadvertently supporting a culture of denial. They point out that “environmental policy does 
not begin with environmental problems.”181 Instead, it is inherently political, and in New 
Zealand‟s case, the international image of a pristine natural environment is critical to the 
powerhouses of the New Zealand economy – the tourism and export industries. The 
international „clean and green‟ image is enhanced by New Zealand‟s nuclear free stance, 
which has given New Zealand the reputation of an environmental hero.182 
The Ministry for the Environment in 2001 published a study which attempted to estimate the 
value of the New Zealand‟s „clean and green‟ image to the economy, finding that although 
ultimately the link between image and export value is indirect, should New Zealand‟s clean, 
green image be tarnished the loss in revenue to dairy exporters could be as much as $569 
million, while the estimated loss to the tourism sector could be as much as $938 million.183 
The „clean and green‟ syndrome meant that people (including policy makers) believed there 
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were few if any environmental problems for New Zealand to be concerned with, particularly 
in comparison to challenges faced by other developed countries such as overpopulation or 
pollution. 
Presently, although many New Zealanders still hold fast to the „clean and green‟ image, there 
is growing concern over international issues such as climate change, but also over domestic 
issues. For example, there is increasing unease at the rate of agricultural conversions to dairy 
farming. Growth in public complaints about water quality has matched growth in the dairy 
industry in the Canterbury region,184 where plans for a large-scale irrigation project, which 
would impact upon two major rivers to support dairy farms have met strong opposition based 
on environmental and sustainability concerns. 
The Public Perceptions of New Zealand Environment study has surveyed public opinion 
since 2000, most recently in 2004. The 2004 study found that on average, New Zealander‟s 
consider the state of the environment to be good or adequate, New Zealand to be clean and 
green, and that they themselves have a good knowledge of the environment and associated 
issues. When asked about the state of specific areas such as air quality, marine issues, rivers 
and lakes, public perception is that the quality is good or very good, even though for some the 
state is actually very poor. In some areas the perceptions did not match the facts. The risk 
created by this mismatch in perceptions and facts is that funding may be diverted to less 
serious problems to reflect public opinion.185 
Conservation issues feature prominently on the public agenda in New Zealand, as opposed to 
issues of resource management – this is due to perceptions of New Zealand as „Godzone‟ and 
the strong link between New Zealand national identity and the image of a pristine and pure 
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natural environment.186 Dew argues that environmentalists in New Zealand have traditionally 
shown a greater affinity and attachment to the land than to people,187 while Buhrs and 
Christoff observe that environmental activism and awareness tends to focus on conservation 
issues, and „wilderness preservation‟.188 For example, when claims of PCP 
(Pentachlorophenol) contamination of land and workers at timber treatment sites around New 
Zealand surfaced internationally in the early 1990s, the Environment Minister at the time, 
Simon Upton, declared that these claims jeopardized NZ Tourism Board‟s London marketing 
campaign.189 Buhrs and Bartlett state that this strong link between identity and land or 
physical environment makes the New Zealand public receptive to conservation issues, but 
point out that while conservation issues are high on the public agenda, for government, 
resource issues are usually of greater priority.190 
3.4 Summary 
The EU and New Zealand share well established environmental management frameworks 
that have strengthened over a period of decades. However, while the EU has gradually 
centralised its system of environmental management, in the case of resource management, 
New Zealand has decentralised, devolving authority to regional level. 
Internationally, the EU has made a significant impact on global environmental developments, 
despite its sometimes complex representation. The EU approach to environmental policy is 
informed by the precautionary principle, impacting its domestic and international actions. 
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New Zealand has suffered from complacency in its domestic environmental policymaking in 
the past and the public has been slower to support and adopt environmentally friendly 
practices, in part arguably a result of the „clean and green‟ syndrome and the fact that the 
public were not faced with immediate environmental problems as Europe has been. New 
Zealand was not seen as being particularly vulnerable, and therefore action was not taken. 
New Zealand is now seen as vulnerable to climate change and negotiations and publicity have 
generated widespread public concern and environmental policy making has expanded to 
incorporate sustainability and environmental objectives across all government operations.  
3.4.1 Normative Power 
At the domestic level, it appears that constructivist concepts such as public perception, 
identity and ideas relating to the environment can play an important part in policymaking, as 
has been argued by Christoff and Buhrs in relation to the strong focus in New Zealand 
environmental activism on conservation issues,191 and in the case of the EU, the strong 
interpretation of the precautionary principle linked to previous public health scares.  
After considering the respective environmental identities and policy making structures of 
each party, it is clear that while constructivism can provide an interesting account of domestic 
identity formation and perceptions which are of relevance to domestic policy-making, it does 
not account for the economic and material factors that are also vital in environmental decision 
making. 
In terms of the EU‟s international role on environment, it has been credited by some scholars 
as exercising normative power in the context of the climate change regime, in relation to 
environmental clauses contained its bilateral agreements, and the environmental acquis 
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exported to candidate countries. However, this influence is undermined by the negative 
environmental impacts in other areas, such as in relation to the CAP and CFP.  
3.4.2 Policy Studies 
For these reasons, constructivism and normative power cannot provide a full and credible 
account of each party‟s development of domestic policy and action at the international level; 
instead, small state theory can explain New Zealand‟s international interaction on 
environment, and a policy studies framework can be applied successfully to domestic 
policymaking in both New Zealand and the EU.  
Small state theory provides a fitting account of New Zealand‟s role in international 
environmental diplomacy. It has taken a narrow focus in international environmental foreign 
policy, acting mostly through institutions, and has demonstrated a moral focus on 
environmental issues, particularly in its anti-nuclear and anti-whaling stances. However, the 
case of New Zealand‟s decision to enact nuclear free legislation and the resulting serious 
consequences for the New Zealand-US relationship is inconsistent with Henderson‟s 
behavioural framework, which assumes that small states will avoid behaviour that risks 
alienating more powerful states.192  
In the case of the EU, its international leadership on climate change for example, could be 
explained as part political opportunism and part promotion of a „race to the top‟ in 
environmental regulation. 
Policy studies can provide a complete account of domestic policy making processes by 
incorporating the role of material and economic factors, as well as the influence of 
perceptions and ideas.  
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4. Overview of European Union and 
New Zealand Relations on Environment 
4.1 Introduction 
The relationship between the European Union and New Zealand has changed considerably 
since the trade disputes of the 1970s resulting from Britain‟s 1973 entry into the EEC. While 
trade remains the focus of the relationship for New Zealand, as the EU as a bloc is New 
Zealand‟s second most important trading partner after Australia,193 the relationship has 
expanded to encompass a wide range of topics and initiatives, including environment. 
As international governance of the environment has expanded and the network of multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) has grown and become inextricably linked to trade, the 
EU-New Zealand relationship has broadened to include dialogue on environmental issues. 
While the focus of both the EU‟s and New Zealand‟s external environmental policies takes 
place in multilateral settings, the close links between trade and environment mean that 
inevitably, interaction on environmental issues in the context of bilateral relationships is also 
necessary.  
From a constructivist perspective, the expansion of bilateral relations between the EU and 
New Zealand on environment could reflect international consensus on the urgency of 
environmental problems faced by the international community, and in a normative power 
context, EU desire to export its environmental values through foreign policy.  
However, in a policy studies context, and particularly taking into consideration small state 
theory to account for New Zealand‟s foreign policy behaviour, the increase of dialogue on 
environment can be attributed to a number of interrelated practical, material factors. Small 
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state theory, and its expectation that small states will focus on trade, explains the interest 
New Zealand has in widening the relationship with the EU; further, the EU‟s diffusion of 
values can instead be characterised as a diffusion of standards motivated by economic 
interests. 
This chapter will outline the development of relations between the EU and New Zealand on 
environmental issues and will give an overview of the status of relations and relevant issues 
in key policy areas of dialogue and cooperation related to environment: research, science and 
technology; chemical and hazardous waste management; biodiversity; and trade and 
environment.  
4.2 Development and Structure of the Relationship on Environment 
4.2.1 Development of Relations 
Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, New Zealand‟s relationship with the EU was 
characterised by protracted negotiations over trade and market access. As the internal and 
external competencies of the EU broadened and the Commission began to represent the 
Union more and more frequently at the international level on issues other than trade, this 
meant that third parties such as New Zealand began to deal directly with EU-level officials in 
Brussels more often. Over the same period, international environmental law making 
expanded quickly as a range of serious environmental challenges rose in prominence due to 
their complexity and global effects.  
These changes are reflected in the relationship between New Zealand and the EU on 
environment. As environmental issues have transitioned from a relatively fringe area of 
politics to a high priority of governments and international organisations, environment has 
become an important part of the relationship between the EU and New Zealand.  
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The first official step in establishing relations on environment was taken in 1991, when the 
parties signed a Science and Technology Cooperation Arrangement, with the goal of 
enhancing dialogue and cooperation in science and technology in a range of areas, one of 
them environment. It provided for cooperation in the form of information exchange, expert 
exchanges and visits to research centres.194 This informal Arrangement was replaced by a 
fully-fledged, formal Agreement in 2008, which provides for the establishment of a Joint 
Committee to oversee the relationship and meet every two years. The first meeting was held 
in early April 2009 in Brussels.195 Under the new Agreement, the EU and New Zealand 
agreed to cooperate in fields of mutual interest within a research, science and technology 
context, including environment.196   
The legal basis for the formal EU-New Zealand relationship is the Joint Declaration on 
Relations and Cooperation, the first version of which was signed in 1999 but which was 
updated in September 2007. The Joint Declaration envisages regular political dialogue 
between officials from the EU and New Zealand, in addition to dialogue and cooperation in 
specific policy areas, setting out the major objectives of the relationship until 2012.197 It 
includes specific provisions for cooperation on environment under the heading “Environment 
and Climate Change”, and Article 38 specifies a number of potential areas of mutual interest 
in which New Zealand and the EU could collaborate in future. They are sustainable and 
renewable energy; tackling climate change; chemical and waste management; biodiversity 
and nature conservation; and water and marine issues.  
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While the expansion of EU-New Zealand dialogue on environment reflects wider 
development in the international community, this does not mean that there are not other 
factors at play. There are commercial benefits to be gained from New Zealand‟s engagement 
in environmental dialogue with the EU and through linking trade and environment.198 For 
example, by keeping abreast of developments in the EU, arguably the most influential actor 
in international environmental negotiations, New Zealand can anticipate potential issues for 
its exporters that may arise from trade barriers based on environmental standards. This 
intersection of trading and environmental interests is a crucial factor when considering 
environmental politics and policy. 
4.2.2 Formal Structure  
EU political relations with third states vary in levels of intensity and frequency of meetings. 
According to Monar, the EU interacts internationally at three main levels of interaction, the 
highest of which is that of meetings involving the head of state of the EU Presidency and the 
president of the Commission; the next level is ministerial and would include the foreign 
minister of the member state holding the Presidency or the Troika; and finally, the level of 
political directors, which would involve the political director of the presidency.199  
New Zealand‟s general political interaction with the EU occurs predominantly at ministerial 
level,200 with biannual meetings taking place between New Zealand‟s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, the European Commissioner for External Relations and the Foreign Minister the EU 
Presidency. These Troika consultations take place in the capital of the EU Member State 
holding the Presidency, dealing mostly with international issues falling under the EU‟s 
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Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This is a particularly high frequency of 
political interaction, especially given New Zealand‟s small size and volume of trade with the 
EU. In comparison, meetings between the EU Troika and Australia, and between the EU 
Troika and Canada, occur annually.201 However, Canada and Australia both interact with the 
EU via various other official bilateral technical committees and formal frameworks. In 
particular, as set out in the EUAustralia Partnership Framework, the EU and Australia engage 
in a separate High Level Dialogue on the Environment.202 Under former Prime Minister John 
Howard, relations on environment were challenging, due to Australia‟s stance on climate 
change and its refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The Australian Joint Partnership with the 
EU, similar to New Zealand‟s Joint Declaration, is arguably more pragmatic than New 
Zealand‟s largely aspirational tone, though it contains less specific reference to 
environmental issues than the New Zealand document.203 
In addition to the biannual Troika meetings, annual EC-New Zealand Senior Officials 
Meetings (SOM) alternate between Brussels and Wellington, with the most recent SOM held 
on 14 May 2008 in Brussels.204 
There are also established dialogues in a range of sectors dealing with specific policy issues. 
These are the EC-New Zealand Agricultural Trade Talks; the EC-New Zealand Fisheries 
Dialogues, which have been held on an ad hoc basis since 2004; the EC-New Zealand Joint 
Science & Technology Cooperation Meetings, which has to date been held only once in 
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2006; and the EU-New Zealand Veterinary Agreement Joint Management Committee.205 
Delivering the 2008 Europa Lecture, former Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters also 
highlighted the ad hoc policy cooperation between the EU and New Zealand on disarmament, 
human rights and development that takes place. In this lecture, he cited cooperation on 
climate change as a “softer” element of EU-New Zealand relations, and described Europe as 
the “source of many of (New Zealand‟s) values and institutions.”206 
Inter-parliamentary visits take place periodically, in general every 12 to 18 months, with 
alternating visits between representatives of the European Parliament and the New Zealand 
Parliament.207 The most recent visit took place in July 2008, when eleven Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) toured New Zealand. 
Apart from these official political and technical EC and EU level dialogues and connections, 
New Zealand also engages on an ad hoc basis with representatives of individual Member 
States, particularly if seeking to influence EU domestic policy issues.208 
4.2.3 Informal Aspects 
A recurring theme in interviews conducted with policy makers throughout the course of this 
research was that of the informal, ad hoc nature of much of their international interaction. A 
former Ministry for Environment policy adviser and negotiator explained that at international 
climate change negotiations, much work was achieved through personal links prior to formal 
talks. He stated that he developed a good rapport with the Dutch and Norwegian delegates 
quite well simply because they were seated together according to United Nations alphabetical 
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seating order. He stressed that much sharing of ideas and communication occurs informally in 
this context.209 This is of course by no means limited to New Zealand‟s international 
interaction with the EU, but reflects both the limited resources available to New Zealand and 
thus the need to make every interaction productive, and also the complex nature of 
international interpersonal linkages and networks. An ERMA policy adviser also referred to 
personal contacts and informal dialogue over a cup of coffee when attending international 
meetings as an important part of his international interaction with EU representatives, 
particularly when attending OECD meetings.210  
This is consistent with Henderson‟s foreign policy characteristics of small state theory, in that 
New Zealand as a small state has limited resources available and must focus these resources 
internationally in order to maximise its presence and maintain relationships. Therefore the 
informal interaction that occurs at international meetings outside the formal program is an 
important part of New Zealand‟s political and technical dialogue with other actors, and of 
course the EU.  
These personal links are also relevant when considering theories of policy transfer, which as 
explained in Chapter Two, places great importance on the role of the individual expert and 
the informal policy networks of which they may be a part. A Ministry for Environment 
official stated that the EU is a major influence for environmental regulation in the policy 
search process, due to their role as a global standard setter in environmental policy, 
characterising New Zealand‟s relationship with the EU on environmental policy as a 
„regulatory, best practice link.‟ More specifically, the official stated that New Zealand tends 
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to look to the UK because of the similarity in systems of environmental administration and 
governance.211 
4.3 European Union-New Zealand Relations on Environment: Case 
Studies 
The following section comprises of four mini case studies of EU-New Zealand relations in 
specific areas of environmental policy. The first two; research, science and technology and 
chemical and hazardous waste management, focus on the bilateral interaction between the EU 
and New Zealand. The final two; biodiversity and trade, address issues that are best 
considered in a wider multilateral context. Each case ends with a summary which evaluates 
the theoretical implications of the evidence presented. 
4.3.1 Research, Science and Technology 
The formal basis for the EU and New Zealand‟s relations on research, science and technology 
is the EU-New Zealand Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, which was signed 
in 2008, upgrading the informal 1991 Arrangement to a fully-fledged formal Agreement. The 
original Arrangement provided for cooperation in areas of mutual interest including 
environment. In practice, a great deal of cooperation and funding in this area focuses on food 
technology and agriculture.212 Cooperation has generally been focused on links between 
institutions and individual researchers, so personal links rather than political ties are 
particularly important. The new Agreement makes more European funding programmes 
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accessible to New Zealand researchers, such as the International Research Staff Exchange 
Scheme which is administered under Framework Programme 7(FP7).213 
Nearly 50% of global non-military research is undertaken in Europe at a cost of NZ$800 
billion per year to member states and associates. A portion of this budget is spent on 
addressing issues at EU level rather than member state level where this is seen to be a 
beneficial approach. This takes place under the Framework Programme for Research and 
Development and is administered in five yearly cycles. The current programme, FP7 covers 
the period 2007-2013 and has a budget of almost NZ$100 billion, access to which is available 
to projects and researchers outside of the EU.214 Both the EU and New Zealand have 
expressed a commitment to enhancing economic growth through targeted research and 
development, as outlined in the EU‟s Lisbon Strategy and New Zealand‟s Economic 
Transformation Agenda.  There is of course a substantial difference in the economic 
resources available to the EU and those available to New Zealand. In addition, compared to 
other OECD countries, levels of industry investment in research and development are very 
low.215 Thus access to European research funding for New Zealand researchers is very 
valuable. In order to support New Zealand researchers in accessing EU funding, the 
organisation Facilitate Research cooperation between Europe and New Zealand (FRENZ) 
was established with funding from New Zealand‟s Ministry of Research, Science and 
Technology (MoRST) and the European Commission.216  
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FRENZ Director Carole Glynn noted that very few applications by New Zealand researchers 
for Framework Programme (FP) funding fall in the „Environment‟ category, and even then 
the research generally tends to focus on agriculture and food science. Under FP6 (2002-2006) 
there were two successful applications under the „Sustainable Development, Global Change 
and Ecosystems‟ heading, and one unsuccessful proposal under the „Environment‟ heading in 
FP7. However, she also stated that the proportion of Marie Curie Fellowship applications 
with an environmental focus has noticeably increased in recent years, as has the amount of 
EU funding allocated to projects with an environmental focus.217 
In 2006 New Zealand hosted the inaugural European Commission-New Zealand Joint 
Science and Technology Cooperation meeting. Representatives from the Ministry of 
Research, Science and Technology (MoRST) and from the European Commission‟s 
Directorate-General (DG) of Research and Delegation to New Zealand met in Wellington on 
November 23.218 A participant at that meeting, Dr Claus Bruening, Climate Change and 
Environmental Risks Research Programme Officer at DG Research, stated that New Zealand 
has a good reputation internationally in environmental research, specifically in stratospheric 
and atmospheric research and agricultural methane emissions. However, the focus of research 
priorities and areas of strength are different due to the different needs and priorities of the 
respective parties.
 The EU focus in climate change research for example is increasingly on 
how science interacts with public policy on social and economic issues, while New Zealand‟s 
focus is on methane emission reduction and from a social perspective, security issues. New 
Zealand has a strong reputation in Antarctic Research and stratospheric and atmospheric 
research. Further, at the time of interviewing in November 2008, Dr Bruening stated that the 
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emerging financial crisis had already affected priorities and budget cuts had been imposed, 
which may affect possibilities for New Zealand researchers in the future.219  
This overview of the EU-New Zealand relationship in research, science and technology 
demonstrates that for New Zealand the relationship has clear practical, financial benefits. In 
this brief case study there is no evidence that norms and values play a role in the relationship. 
In particular, there is no evidence that the EU exercises normative power in this context. 
Instead, small state theory can better account for New Zealand‟s pragmatic involvement with 
the EU in terms of accessing funding and resources for its researchers. Also, much of the 
practical relationship relies heavily on exploiting existing links and networks between 
researchers and institutions, a fact that speaks more to the small state theory theme of 
maximising limited resources than to normative power. 
4.3.2 Chemical and Hazardous Waste Management 
New Zealand works closely with the EU internationally on the management of chemicals and 
hazardous waste. Most interaction on this subject occurs within the context of the OECD, 
where both New Zealand and the EC are represented.  
Particularly in the area of chemicals management, New Zealand looks to the EU for examples 
of best practice. The EU has the financial resources to carry out extensive risk analysis for 
new and existing substances; something that New Zealand in most instances simply does not 
have the budget to do.220 Therefore it makes practical sense in many cases for New Zealand 
to make use of EU data and research results where they are available, and even to import EU 
standards and regulations. 
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In terms of how important the relationship with the EU is in this context, a high-ranking 
policy adviser at New Zealand‟s Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA), who 
enjoys a high profile internationally as an expert in chemicals management both within the 
UN and the OECD on chemicals and biotechnology regulation, stated that New Zealand‟s 
relations with the EU, Australia, Canada and the US are the most significant for New 
Zealand, in terms of formal dialogues, with the formal relationships being coordinated 
through MFAT. At the level of operational policy, he said, New Zealand, Canada, Australia 
and the EU are very similar in their approach and structure.221 
In 2006, it became necessary to establish a group standard for cosmetics, setting out which 
chemicals cosmetics made or imported into New Zealand may contain and at what 
concentrations. ERMA222 looked to the EU and decided to incorporate many aspects of the 
EU Cosmetics Directive (Council Directive 76/768/EEC), which ERMA described as the 
cosmetic industry‟s „benchmark standard,‟ even going so far as to state that they “like to keep 
in line with the EU.”223 Additionally, the New Zealand standard proposed a ban on a 
substance not covered by the EU Directive, methyl methacrylate.224 The group standard was 
further updated in 2008 to keep up with amendments to the EU directive. 
There are a number of reasons for the adoption of the EU standard. The ERMA participant 
stated that it was for reasons of simplicity and efficiency. As there are a multitude of 
chemicals in commercial use to be regulated, it was easier (and cheaper) to adopt an existing 
regulation, for which extensive research had already been carried out, rather than starting 
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from scratch. Further, the participant explained that most international linkage between the 
EU and New Zealand in this policy area is technical in nature, such as arranging access to 
data. Given New Zealand‟s limited resources, access to international databases and research 
is invaluable. The EU oversees one of the most extensive, comprehensive chemicals 
databases in the world, thanks to their substantial government and industry funding for 
chemicals research and a well established regulatory framework.225 This was echoed in 
interviews with Ministry for Environment policy advisers who highlighted New Zealand‟s 
limited resources and inability to carry out risk analysis on the same scale as the EU, and 
therefore look to the EU and the OECD for data and regulatory best practice.226 
However, although this explains why it might be a good idea to import regulation in general, 
it does not necessarily explain why it was specifically beneficial to New Zealand to adopt the 
EU standard.  
In terms of the impact of trade, New Zealand imports €389 million worth of chemicals and 
chemical products from the EU annually. This accounts for 13.4% of New Zealand‟s total 
imports from the EU227 and approximately 13% of New Zealand‟s total chemical imports.228  
The EU is already on New Zealand‟s radar when it comes to the importance of dialogue and 
following best practice in chemicals management. This is because the EU currently accounts 
for approximately 60% of world trade in chemicals, making them the global standard setter in 
this context simply by virtue of their economic influence. For example, the EU carried out 
major reform of its chemicals management regime and the resulting regulation on the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical Substances (known as 
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REACH), which entered into force in 2007, has already had an impact beyond the EU‟s 
borders and will have a strong influence on chemical standards worldwide.229 This is not only 
a result of the EU‟s market share and economic power, but also because the EU is actively 
promoting REACH, and more broadly, the precautionary principle embodied by REACH, in 
international fora such as the OECD and encouraging the adoption of REACH standards by 
third countries. Some might describe this as EU normative power; others describe this as the 
EU taking a „defensive management‟ approach to globalisation.230 Although the EU currently 
dominates the global chemicals trade, the EU share of that trade is gradually falling as Asian 
economies increase their export production.231 In this line of argument, the EU is therefore on 
the defensive and seeking ways to protect its position in chemicals trade. One way it would 
be possible to achieve this is to push for stricter environmental standards internationally 
through the MEA process knowing that this will disadvantage its developing competitors, 
which is what some observers suspect the EU is attempting to do. In promoting its domestic 
standards and norms at the international level, the EU uses its position as a respected 
environmental leader to encourage their inclusion in MEAs and endorsement or adoption by 
third countries. 
While there have been objections raised against REACH from some actors outside the EU, in 
particular the US and Japan, on the grounds that it imposes steep costs on chemical producers 
outside the EU,232 according to an ERMA Policy Adviser New Zealand is generally 
„comfortable‟ with it. He pointed out that it is necessary to recognise that the EU is a large 
primary market for chemicals, while New Zealand‟s market is a secondary, consumer market. 
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Therefore the EU‟s needs and issues of concern, when it comes to chemicals regulation, are 
very different to the needs and concerns of New Zealand, and this reflected in the high 
standards that the EU has implemented. In terms of the respective desired outcomes of 
REACH and New Zealand‟s HSNO, they are broadly compatible.233 
The Joint Declaration of 2007 specified chemical and hazardous waste management as an 
area of potentially closer collaboration. The ERMA participant explained that this clause 
dated from an earlier, less formal arrangement which he believed dated from approximately 
2002. The participant is most likely referring to the 2004 Action Plan which, under the 
heading „Environment‟, specified chemicals management as an area of cooperation and called 
for an expert level meeting to be held in 2004 to set out detailed proposals for technical 
collaboration.234 The ERMA adviser and New Zealand‟s key Commission contact on the 
subject agreed at that time not to establish a formal, independent process but to continue to 
meet informally at OECD meetings, where most dealings between the EU and New Zealand 
on chemical and hazardous waste management occur. Despite the Joint Declaration clause, 
the adviser said the specific technicalities of closer collaboration had not yet been examined. 
As of July 2008, the adviser and his EU counterpart had yet to decide if this would be 
enhanced and formalised under the new Joint Declaration. 
New Zealand‟s dialogue with the EU on chemicals and hazardous waste is more closely tied 
to MFAT‟s Economic Division than to its environment section, as one of the key issues in the 
relationship is the EU‟s attempts to interpret and apply the precautionary principle 
internationally, as mentioned above. In particular, this has become a rather controversial 
subject in relation to MEAs on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), as promotion of the 
precautionary principle in this context is viewed by some as a potential trade barrier by 
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proxy.235 Although New Zealand applies a similar interpretation of the precautionary 
principle domestically to the EU, and indeed, it is currently enshrined in the RMA,236 when it 
comes to applying this principle internationally, New Zealand has legitimate concerns over 
the effect this could have on trade and has on occasion demanded more restricted reference to 
it in international negotiations. In one high profile case, the EU invoked the principle to 
restrict imports of US beef, a move that was eventually overturned by the WTO.237 This past 
experience has made many actors, New Zealand included, wary of strong interpretations of 
the principle being used in international law. 
Another area in which New Zealand and the EU have differed in opinion within the context 
of chemical and hazardous waste management is with regard to the Basel Convention of the 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste. An amendment to the Convention was 
proposed in 1994 banning the export of hazardous waste intended for final disposal from 
OECD countries to non-OECD countries.238 In principle, the amendment is aimed at 
preventing dumping of toxic waste in non-OECD countries. However, the amendment fails to 
allow flexibility for the situation of an OECD member like New Zealand – isolated and small, 
and lacking the scale to support an extensive recycling industry for some types of hazardous 
waste. New Zealand has not ratified the amendment because it must export waste for 
recycling to countries like Singapore, Korea and the Philippines; for example, batteries are 
sent from New Zealand to the Philippines to be recycled.239 The EU however implemented 
the amendment in 1997 and it was highlighted by several New Zealand interview participants 
as being a significant point of contention in the EU-New Zealand relationship and as an 
example of what one participant described as the EU‟s occasional tendency to be a bit „high 
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and mighty‟, implying that sometimes it acts without full consideration of the implications for 
other actors.240  
The EU-New Zealand relationship on chemical and hazardous waste management is technical 
in nature, and relatively ad hoc, with technical interaction occurring via personal links and the 
OECD, at a technical, policy level as opposed to a political level. Due to its the economic 
influence in chemicals trade, the EU enjoys great influence over international regulatory 
standards, not only through MEA negotiations by also by virtue of the size of its market and 
the resources available to it. New Zealand‟s adoption of the EU Cosmetics Directive as the 
New Zealand Cosmetics Standard is an example of New Zealand acting pragmatically and 
recognising both its own resource limitations and the economic significance of the EU. The 
economic influence of the EU, with an already well established regulatory framework and 
extensive research database, made it logical for New Zealand to look to follow the EU lead in 
this area. There is no evidence of normative power at work; instead EU enthusiasm for 
exporting standards seems intrinsically linked to self-interest, as is New Zealand‟s adherence 
to those standards. Rather this aspect of the relationship is best explained through policy 
transfer, which accounts for the transfer of the Cosmetics Directive. Based on the statements 
of several interview participants on looking to the EU for best practice, the EU is an 
important policy learning site in this policy area. Small state theory can also account for some 
aspects of this relationship, as New Zealand seeks to take advantage of the information and 
resources available to it through the EU. It also accounts for the fact that much of the 
technical dialogue is conducted through personal, informal channels at the OECD, reflecting 
New Zealand‟s preference for maximising its limited resources. 
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4.3.3 Biodiversity 
The EU and New Zealand have also had differences of opinion within the context of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), in particular in relation to the Cartagena Protocol 
to the CBD, which deals with the transboundary movement of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs). Unlike climate change, which is an issue on which New Zealand and the 
EU share broadly similar points of view, in the context of the CBD their positions diverge 
due to inherent differences in domestic systems and preferences. 
This has been particularly linked to the EU‟s promotion of the precautionary principle in the 
CBD, and the Cartagena Protocol, attempting to gain support for its inclusion in a very strong 
form in the Protocol, and more recently in other agreements to be negotiated under the CBD. 
New Zealand has been concerned, along with a number of like-minded states such as Japan, 
Norway and Switzerland as part of the „Compromise Group‟ at the Cartagena negotiations, 
that this strong interpretation of the precautionary principle could be invoked to restrict trade 
in harmless goods and could be used to protect domestic producers. The EU, unlike the US 
for example, has few domestic producers in this area that would be affected by restrictions, 
but the potential gains are considerable.241 New Zealand has argued instead for a scientific 
basis for determining risk and imposing restrictions.242 The final text in the preamble to 
Cartagena Protocol reads: “where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of 
biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.”243 In practice the principle would 
come into play when there is reason to believe a particular cause of action could result in “a 
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threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity.” However, there is already a 
great deal of debate over how best to approach biosafety assessment and regulation, and the 
wording of the clause means that disagreement is likely over what constitutes a valid reason 
to suspect a threat.244 New Zealand is concerned about the potential under agreement for the 
precautionary principle to be invoked as a form of economic protectionism, rather than 
genuinely in the best interests of the environment or public health. New Zealand also has 
concerns within the context of the CBD regarding ensuring maximum flexibility and 
recognition for countries with indigenous species and acknowledging differences in 
environmental systems, as opposed to a „one size fits all‟ approach.245  
This stance led to a perception in the EU that New Zealand was prioritising trade interests 
over environmental protection. In 2006, New Zealand was described along with Norway and 
Iceland, as having a „destructive attitude‟ by the German Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety website, with reference to discussions in a meeting 
of the Open-Ended Working Group on Protected Areas under the CBD.246 However, from the 
New Zealand perspective, it was never a question of prioritising trade over environment, but 
rather a case of balancing both to ensure that the clause would not be abused and trade 
unjustly restricted. 
At COP 9 in May 2008 New Zealand‟s CBD delegation worked to address this perception.247 
The dialogue on the CBD has started to change from a source of conflict into a more 
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constructive dialogue, something that a Ministry for Environment official credited to the 
recent work of MFAT‟s Environment Division in „repackaging‟ New Zealand‟s message.248  
New Zealand‟s economic focus is consistent with small state theory. As a small nation 
relying heavily on exports, and in particular exports to the EU, New Zealand has a different, 
more cautious approach to application of the precautionary principle to international 
agreements because it has the potential to enable trade restrictions. It cannot be shown that 
the EU exercises normative power in this case, as New Zealand‟s stance on this issue reflects 
its pragmatism and own material interests. 
4.3.4 Trade and Environment 
The question of how to balance economic interests with protection of the environment is 
becoming more and more pressing. It is within the EU‟s capacity as a powerful economic 
actor that its environmental weaknesses and contradictions become apparent, but some argue 
that it is also where the EU has the potential to make the greatest environmental impact.  
The EU has been widely criticised for its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), both for its 
international economic effects and its environmental implications. Through its subsidies to 
EU producers, the CAP had the effect for many years of encouraging unsustainably intensive 
agriculture. Even after reform it is a central focus in the ongoing World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) negotiations and has been criticised by development NGOs for its negative effect on 
incomes in developing countries.249 The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has also been the 
subject of intense criticism as it has allowed European fleets access to distant-water fishing in 
developing countries.250 
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Internationally, there are questions over how to ensure consistency and compatibility between 
Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA) legal requirements and the rules of the WTO, 
which prohibit discrimination against goods that have been unsustainably produced. MEAs 
such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the Montreal 
Protocol already place restrictions on trade in order to achieve environmental objectives.251 
However, there is a substantial difference between multilaterally agreed upon trade 
restrictions and attempts to unilaterally discriminate based on domestic environmental 
regulation. 
Both New Zealand and the EU are participants in the OECD‟s Joint Working Party on Trade 
and Environment. An MfE Policy Adviser explained that the OECD interaction provides an 
opportunity for New Zealand and the EU to share information on negotiating environmental 
provisions in trade agreements, on mandates and on implementation of environmental clauses 
in trade agreements. Both the EU and New Zealand tend to focus on cooperation and capacity 
building in environmental clauses attached to trade agreements. New Zealand also 
pragmatically looks to achieve trade objectives through these environmental capacity 
building clauses, for example looking to export technology and practices in specific areas, 
such as management of water or hazardous waste.252 
All New Zealand‟s trade agreements have environmental and labour standards attached, 
placing trade firmly within a sustainability context. EU trade agreements typically encompass 
these areas and may include clauses on social standards as well. A Ministry for Environment 
official commented that because the EU has more „clout‟ than New Zealand, once the EU 
successfully includes these kinds of clauses in its agreements it is easier for New Zealand to 
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follow their lead and do the same in its own negotiations.253 In this context, an MfE Adviser 
stated that the EU is very important to New Zealand. The EU leads the way on sustainability, 
climate change and waste management, and New Zealand looks to the EU for best practice in 
domestic policy. Particularly within an OECD context, the EU plays a strong leadership role. 
Equally however, the adviser felt that the EU has perhaps incorporated elements of New 
Zealand‟s collaborative, consultative approach to negotiation of environmental clauses of 
trade agreements, stating that the work New Zealand carries out in trade negotiations is 
„world-leading.‟254  
However, some of the principles that form the foundation of New Zealand‟s international 
trade policy put it at odds with the EU. In line with New Zealand‟s preference for an open 
international economy and trade liberalisation, New Zealand works towards the elimination 
of export subsidies and the use of environmental standards as economic protectionism by 
proxy.255 The EU has recently chosen to re-establish subsidies on dairy products in order to 
protect European dairy farmers in the current economic climate, subsidies which are in line to 
be abolished in the next round of World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations, but which 
they are currently still entitled to apply under WTO rules.256 As discussed in the section on 
biodiversity, New Zealand has clashed with the EU over their promotion of the precautionary 
principle in international environmental agreements because of the potential for it to be 
invoked as a non-tariff trade barrier. 
New Zealand policy makers keep a close watch on changes to regulations and public opinion 
in the EU as they have the potential to have a significant negative impact on New Zealand 
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exporters. For example, in recent years public concern over the so-called „food miles‟ issue 
grew in the EU, and became particularly accepted in the UK. Campaigners argued that food 
should be purchased as close to the source of production as possible, to avoid the use of fossil 
fuels and associated emissions of greenhouse gases required to transport food products from 
source to consumer.257 This argument alarmed New Zealand exporters, as New Zealand 
products began to become the focus of debate due to the long distance they must travel to 
reach the UK.  
However, a research team at Lincoln University argued that rather than focusing on the 
distance a product has travelled, which is a relatively simplistic argument, total energy 
expended during the entire production process ought to be taken into account, including 
transport. They studied the production processes of a range of New Zealand food products to 
account for the total energy expended from production to consumer and compared them with 
UK equivalents, finding that all New Zealand products were less energy intensive than their 
UK counterparts. In particular, they found that New Zealand dairy is produced at least twice 
as efficiently as the equivalent UK product, while sheep meat production is four times more 
energy efficient.258 There is now a better understanding of the complexity of the issue in the 
EU, which is now in the very early stages of discussing the development of a life cycle 
assessment which fully accounts for energy used in production.259  
The „food miles‟ issue has since abated and has been transformed into a „buy local‟ focus. 
However, these issues are typically driven by lobby and interest groups within the EU, 
meaning that they are not so much a question of EU-New Zealand relations but rather a 
question of New Zealand relations with EU interest groups. Just as New Zealand‟s embassies 
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monitor changes to EU regulations that may affect New Zealand‟s trade, they also keep an 
eye on active lobby groups to anticipate campaigns and changes in public opinion.260  
In addition, the EU has established an eco-labelling scheme with the aim of aiding consumers 
to make informed choices. A Ministry for Environment Senior Adviser commented that New 
Zealand is trying to be as involved as possible in the process, describing this as „defensive 
interaction‟ because of the potential consequences for New Zealand‟s exporters.261 The 
scheme does not currently include food products, but there is a proposal to include 
“processed food and products of fishing and aquaculture,”262 so it is possible that food 
products may be included in the future. 
Of course, any restriction of trade based on environmental criteria risks being portrayed as 
simply a new trade barrier. Free trade agreements are proliferating, and states are looking for 
new ways to exclude some products from their markets. A Ministry for Environment adviser 
stated that in their personal opinion, the use of environmental standards as trade barriers is 
likely to increase in the future. As he explained it, in a trade context, countries are constantly 
in competition and looking for „levers.‟263 
As already touched on in the section on chemicals management, some scholars have argued 
that the EU takes a „defensive management‟ approach to the nexus between trade and 
environment.264 They claim that as the EU has met with increasing public concern over 
environmental standards on the one hand, and increased competition from emerging 
economies on the other, it has made domestic regulations tighter. However, tighter EU 
restrictions have met with international opposition and the threat of legal action through the 
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WTO. Therefore the EU has sought to actively „internationalise‟ its approach through MEAs 
such as the Cartagena Protocol to the CBD in 2000, and by encouraging adoption of its 
domestic standards in third countries. This is very similar to the concept of a „race to the top‟ 
which sees countries tighten environmental standards to match others.265 Rather than the 
desire to diffuse a normative belief in protecting the environment, the EU gains significant 
economic advantages if it can successfully internationalise its domestic standards. 
The relationship between the EU and New Zealand on the trade and environment nexus is 
another example of a pragmatic relationship as opposed to a constructivist or normative one. 
The EU uses normative arguments to impose environmental standards as non-tariff trade 
barriers, to protect its own economic interests. New Zealand seeks to improve its domestic 
environmental standards to preserve access to international markets, in particular markets of 
environmentally demanding consumers such as the EU, and to gain access to new developing 
markets. Rather than the EU seeking to diffuse environmental norms, it is instead 
internationalising its domestic standards in order to protect its markets from increasing 
competition from emerging economies and to protect itself from WTO legal challenges. 
Consistent with small state theory, one of New Zealand‟s primary foreign policy priorities is 
a firm focus on pragmatic trading interests. Where New Zealand and the EU have faced 
differences in opinion in this area, it has been related to New Zealand‟s focus on its economic 
interests and stance for trade liberalisation, and the EU‟s moves towards internationalising its 
domestic standards. Also consistent with small state theory, New Zealand relies on the EU, 
with its superior economic muscle, to „break the ice‟ when it comes to incorporating 
environmental clauses in new trade agreements with third countries. 
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Statements by interview participants that New Zealand looks to the EU for best practice in 
this area also cannot be shown to be based on normative influence; instead they are best 
explained in pragmatic policy studies terms as the EU‟s economic power and profile 
influencing New Zealand policy makers in their policy search process. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
The EU-New Zealand relationship has broadened considerably in the last two decades to 
include dialogue and cooperation across a wide range of policy areas. However, the pivotal 
focus of the relationship from New Zealand‟s point of view has not changed and remains 
trading and economic interests. 
4.4.1 Normative Power 
Recalling the hypotheses posed at the end of the second chapter of this thesis, it was argued 
that if normative power was present in the relationship, it would be possible to directly link 
developments in domestic policy with developments in the EU‟s relationship with New 
Zealand. Further, it would have to be demonstrated that neither party were motivated by 
material benefits in the context of the relationship. After conducting mini case-studies on the 
EU-New Zealand relationship on environment in four policy areas, it is clear that these 
requirements cannot be met.  
In the first case study on relations in the field of research, science and technology, the 
majority of New Zealand‟s interaction with the EU involves individual researchers and 
institutions participating in exchanges and making use of EU funding. This is driven, on New 
Zealand‟s part, purely by practical and financial considerations.  
In the case of relations on chemical and hazardous waste management, rather than being 
pressured by normative arguments, the EU‟s economic might in the chemicals industry along 
99 
 
with New Zealand‟s comparative lack of resources can explain why New Zealand adopted 
the EC Chemicals Directive. Although New Zealand looks to the EU for examples of best 
practice, this perhaps reflects the resources available to the EU and the sophistication of EU 
regulation in this area, for which they are credited as leading the world. 
Further, in the examples of relations on biodiversity and the trade and environment nexus, 
instead of normative explanations, the underlying motivations are consistently shown to be 
economic and material. The EU could arguably be shown to be seeking the incorporation of a 
strong interpretation of the precautionary principle in the Cartagena Protocol for economic 
and practical reasons. 
It is not possible to conclude on the basis of this overview of relations that normative power 
plays any demonstrable role in the EU-New Zealand relationship. 
4.4.2 Policy Studies 
After considering the nature of New Zealand‟s interactions with the EU in four areas, two 
with a bilateral focus of interaction and the two in a multilateral context, there is no evidence 
that there is a normative aspect to the relationship in these areas. Instead, the common theme 
in all four areas is overwhelmingly consistent with a small state theory account of New 
Zealand‟s foreign policy behaviour and with a policy studies approach to domestic policy-
making in New Zealand and to the transfer of policy between the parties. Rather than 
exchanging norms and values, the parties in this relationship exchange knowledge and 
standards. 
Where regulation has been transferred, as was the case with the EU Cosmetics Directive, it 
cannot be shown to be the result of any EU normative power influencing New Zealand‟s 
decisions. Rather, what is demonstrated consistently is that such decisions are the result of a 
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pragmatic focus on economic interest, in particular recognition of New Zealand‟s limited 
resources and the advantages to be gained through close links with the EU, whether it be 
access to data and knowledge, or funding for cooperative research projects. Frequent 
references to the EU as a source of best practice and policy are also best explained through 
practical, material considerations. Equally, although the EU may present its environmental 
arguments in moral and normative terms, it has been shown that in each case the EU is in fact 
acting for economic reasons. What may appear to be normative power as the EU actively 
promotes the diffusion of its domestic norms and values internationally, is in fact the EU 
promoting its domestic standards and regulations, which is quite a different proposition and 
fits with an explanation of the EU taking a „defensive management‟ approach to 
globalisation. 
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5: European Union and New Zealand 
Relations on Climate Change 
5.1 Introduction 
Much scholarly attention has been paid to the EU‟s global environmental role, and more 
specifically, to its role in the global climate change framework. The EU has positioned itself 
as the global leader on climate change, by committing to unilateral reduction targets, and by 
leading ratification of the Kyoto Protocol after US withdrawal. 
Some have ascribed to it the role of a „classic norm entrepreneur‟ by defining climate change 
as a moral issue, calling for states to transcend traditional economic concerns and take a 
holistic approach to the challenge. The EU has actively promoted the application of the 
precautionary principle to climate change, and has put into action the UNFCCC 
recommendation that developed nations have the responsibility to take the lead in climate 
change given their historical contribution to the problem. They argue that the EU‟s climate 
change policy has identified it as a particular kind of actor, one with a normative agenda.266  
However, it can also be said that the EU has acted as a political or policy entrepreneur on 
climate change. By taking the lead internationally and acting first, setting demanding 
unilateral domestic targets, leading ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and implementing the 
first multi-national carbon emissions trading scheme, the EU has become the global standard 
setter in climate change politics and thus wields substantial influence over the direction of 
international climate change policy, regardless of whether or not this role can be said to have 
normative implications.267  
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If the EU‟s alleged normative power is at work in the context of this specific relationship, it 
should be possible to demonstrate that New Zealand‟s climate change policy has evolved in 
response to EU normative leadership and pressure, and that the EU is indeed exporting its 
values beyond its borders and affecting policy in a third country on climate change. In the 
particular case study on emissions trading, one would expect that there might be a reasonable 
sequence of events in which EU promotion of emissions trading as a norm can be 
demonstrably linked to subsequent adoption by New Zealand of its own emissions trading 
policy.  
However, a more practical explanation might be that, consistent with small state theory, New 
Zealand exhibits the foreign policy characteristics typical of a small state and acts based on 
its own practical needs, not normative influence, with trading and commercial considerations 
at the heart of its agenda. Further, it would be argued that the development of New Zealand‟s 
policy on emissions trading is an example of voluntary policy transfer based on pragmatism 
and material interests. In this approach, New Zealand shares core values with the EU 
regardless of the relationship between them on environment, not because of it. In this 
scenario, if the EU does indeed wield normative power on climate change, it cannot be 
demonstrated to extend to its bilateral relations with New Zealand on climate change. 
This chapter examines relations between the EU and New Zealand on climate change, and 
more specifically on emissions trading. It will first summarise the development of the current 
international climate change policy framework, the commitments that the EU and New 
Zealand have made within the international framework and what instruments are available to 
them. It will highlight the particular challenges facing each of the parties and the differences 
and similarities in their respective positions at international negotiations, in order to establish 
the context within which the relationship on climate change takes place. 
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The chapter will then move on to discuss the broad relationship between the EU and New 
Zealand on climate change before approaching in greater detail the cooperation that occurred 
between officials from New Zealand and the EU on emissions trading. It will compare the 
two conceptions of the EU outlined above, those of normative power and of policy standard-
setter, in order to conclude which approach best characterises the role of the EU in its 
relationship with New Zealand on climate change. Does the relationship show evidence of the 
EU acting as a normative entrepreneur, or are the dynamics of the relationship better 
explained by considering the EU as a policy entrepreneur or agenda setter on climate change?  
5.2 European Union-New Zealand Relations on Climate Change in an 
International Context 
In the late 1980‟s, international concern rose over the “greenhouse effect” of rising 
temperatures as a result of emissions of greenhouse gasses such as carbon dioxide (CO2). 
Political momentum increased rapidly and climate change soon became an important 
international environmental policy focus. The EU played a central role in the international 
negotiation process, particularly with regard to the Kyoto Protocol, as a result of which the 
EU has been described as being “catapulted” to the role of a global climate change leader.268 
New Zealand has also played an important role at the international level, particularly as part 
of the JUSSCANNZ269 group in its promotion of emissions trading as a policy tool, and with 
several New Zealand representatives chairing key international bodies in the regime at 
various stages in the process. 
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5.2.1 The International Climate Change Regime 
In 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
informally known as the Earth Summit, took place in Rio de Janiero. It was the culmination 
of a process of discussion and negotiation which had begun in December 1989, spurred by 
the 1987 release of the Brundtland Report titled Our Common Future, which called for a 
holistic approach to environment and sustainable economic development.  
At the Earth Summit, which was attended by representatives from 172 governments as well 
as numerous NGOs, several important multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) were 
concluded, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).  
The UNFCCC document resulted in parties undertaking to stabilise emissions at a level 
which, it was estimated, would not interfere with the climate system. The EU had already 
unilaterally committed to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the 
year 2000, and pushed hard at Rio for binding targets to be set for all developed countries, 
albeit unsuccessfully. They took the position that developed countries had a responsibility to 
act first before expectations could be placed on developing states, flowing from a general 
belief that industrialised countries bear most responsibility.270 The UNFCCC divided the 
parties into two groups: Annex 1 states agreed to take measures to reduce climate change at 
the national level and to conduct regular inventories. Annex 2 states, a subset of Annex 1, 
additionally agreed to provide assistance to developing countries.271 The EU and New 
Zealand were members of both of these groups. 
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In international environmental law, once a framework agreement has been established it is 
standard for a protocol to be developed to define specific obligations. Following the signature 
and ratification of the Convention, the parties to the UNFCCC met annually as a Conference 
of the Parties (COP) with the aim of finalising a protocol containing binding obligations in 
time for the 1997 COP3.272 The first COP was held in Berlin in 1995, which produced the 
Berlin Mandate, calling for a protocol that would set quantified objectives for Annex 1 
parties.273  
The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 
February 2005. 183 countries have ratified the Protocol, which commits developed and 
transitioning economies to collectively reduce emissions of four greenhouse gasses (carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride) and two groups of gasses 
(hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons) to 5% below 1990 levels by 2008-2012.274 The 
Protocol itself left the issues of how to actually achieve these targets open, with negotiations 
to take place at later COPs. 
New Zealand‟s individual commitment under the Protocol for the first commitment period 
(2008-2012) was to return its emissions to 100% of 1990 levels in the first commitment 
period of 2008-2012.275. This would be achieved through the three market mechanisms 
allowed for under Kyoto, which will be elaborated below, and also through the provisions for 
the use of carbon sinks. 
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Under Kyoto, the targets that parties are obliged to meet in the first commitment period of 
2008-2012 can be thought of as allowed emissions levels. These allowed levels of emissions 
must be matched by emissions units, each worth one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent 
emissions. These units are termed Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). In order to account for 
emissions that may occur over and above the allowed level of emissions, the Protocol 
provides for a number of mechanisms through which parties can generate tradable emissions 
units.276 
The Protocol obliges parties to meet their emissions reduction obligations through domestic 
policy measures, but provides for three additional market-based tools as options for greater 
flexibility, supplemental to domestic action and allowing parties to carry out and fund 
international emission reduction projects, and receive credits towards reducing their own 
emissions at a lower cost than could be achieved if reductions are made domestically. These 
flexible mechanisms are Joint Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and emissions trading. 
Joint Implementation allows Annex 1 parties to earn Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) by 
undertaking an emission reduction project in another Annex 1 party under Article 6 of the 
Kyoto Protocol.277 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for the CDM, which allows an Annex 1 party to 
earn Certified Emissions Reduction Units (CERs) by carrying out emissions reduction 
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projects in a non-Annex 1 party, or in other words, a developing country.278 This results in a 
transfer of technology between developed and developing countries. 
Emissions trading is provided for by Article 17 of the Protocol, and operates by effectively 
creating a market for the right to emit. Parties that have excess AAUs because they have 
gained credits through carbon sinks or because their reductions are expected to exceed their 
targets can sell these units to parties whose reductions fall short of their targets. In addition to 
AAUs, there are specific tradable units available, each equal to one tonne of CO2. They are 
Removal Units (RMUs) which derive from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) 
activities, also referred to as carbon sinks, such as reforestation; and as already discussed 
above, ERUs resulting from JI projects; and CERs which result from CDM projects.279 
5.2.2 The European Union and New Zealand in the International Climate Regime 
The European Union 
In 1990, the European Council in Dublin decided that the European Community should play 
a leading role in the promotion of international action on the environment, in particular in 
negotiations on climate change leading into the 1992 Earth Summit. The Council called for 
the adoption of strategies to reduce emissions of greenhouse gasses, setting a unilateral goal 
of stabilising emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. As a result of this commitment, the EU 
assumed the lead role in the UN negotiations prior to the Rio summit for the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).280 Between 1990 and 1992 a range 
of EC and member state initiatives were implemented, for example the Special Action 
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programme for Vigorous Energy efficiency (SAVE) and ALTENER, a programme for the 
promotion of renewable energy sources. Also, several member states unilaterally adopted 
policies targeted at reducing emissions prior to Rio. As a result of these voluntary 
implementations, the EU was seen internationally and domestically as pro-active and 
innovative in leading the response to climate change,281 and this helped strengthen the EU 
position in negotiations. By the time the UNFCCC negotiations officially commenced in 
early 1991, the EU had firmly established a reputation for itself as a leader in international 
environmental politics and set the global benchmark by unilaterally committing to return its 
joint CO2 emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.
282 
In March 1997, the EU finalised the burden sharing agreement which set differentiated 
reduction targets for its member states to make up a collective EU target under the future 
FCCC Protocol.283 This strengthened the EU position at the Kyoto negotiations later that year 
as it allowed the EU to set a relatively tough reduction target of 8%.284 However, it also 
undermined the EU in its anti-emissions trading stance, as the burden sharing agreement 
operates essentially as a form of emissions trading scheme.285  
The EU was opposed to the idea of states meeting targets solely through the available flexible 
mechanisms of emissions trading, Joint Implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism 
and carbon sinks, and pushed hard for a 50% cap on the proportion of emissions that could be 
reduced through trading and JI to ensure that they were linked to binding targets and 
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timetables, and would be supplemental to, and not a substitute for, effective domestic 
action.286  
The EU is often credited with playing an important leadership role in the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Although the United States (US), under the Clinton Government, signed the 
Protocol in 1998, it was never presented to the Senate for ratification, until President George 
W. Bush formally announced in 2001 that the US would not ratify the Protocol. This was a 
potentially fatal blow to the Protocol, which required at least 55 states representing at least 
55% of 1990 carbon dioxide emissions by Annex 1 countries to ratify before entering into 
force, as the US represented nearly 30% of Annex 1 emissions. In order for the Protocol to 
enter into force, almost every other developed country would have to ratify, and it was 
especially vital that large emitters like Japan, Russia and Canada did not also back out. 287  
Despite this setback, the EU announced it would forge ahead with its own ratification 
process, even though ensuring entry into force seemed a near impossible task. EU 
environment commissioner Margot Wallstrom commented on the announcement of the 
decision “I think something has changed today in the balance of power between the US and 
the EU.”288 From that point on, the EU spearheaded the continuation of negotiations, 
convening COP6 part II in Bonn in July 2001, where the Bonn Agreements on what had 
previously been the key points of contention were adopted.289 
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New Zealand 
New Zealand‟s role in international climate negotiations is best characterised as that of a 
broker, rather than an agenda-setter. However, it has played an influential role in negotiations 
on specific issues of particular economic importance to New Zealand. 
In New Zealand, business groups argued for making ratification of the Protocol conditional 
on ratification by New Zealand‟s major trading partners out of concern that domestic trade 
and industry would be adversely affected. However, the fifth Labour Government argued that 
New Zealand ought to “lead by example” and that time was of the essence in ensuring the 
Protocol came into force, despite US withdrawal. As Jian Yang observed, this was in line 
with the Labour government‟s approach to international relations and global citizenship, 
which he describes as relatively idealist.290 However, at the time there were also more 
pragmatic reasons for the government‟s decision to ratify the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol 
provides for tradable credits for carbon sinks in the form of forests planted after 1990, 
allowing for the carbon dioxide they absorb. This mechanism was a key factor in the 
government‟s argument for ratification, as it was believed that New Zealand could earn as 
much as $1.4 billion from its domestic forests.291 The National Interest Analysis released in 
2002 further emphasised the benefits of swift ratification, stating that New Zealand would be 
in a more credible position to influence later negotiations if it was seen to be acting as a 
leader with environmental concerns as its top priority.292 New Zealand ratified the Protocol in 
December 2002, fulfilling a campaign promise made by Labour prior to the elections of that 
year. 
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New Zealand‟s greenhouse gas emissions profile is unusual when compared with other 
OECD countries, and consideration for this drives New Zealand‟s international climate 
change policy. Agricultural emissions of methane and nitrous oxide make up almost 50% of 
total emissions, while emissions from energy production account for 44%. Compared to other 
industrialised Kyoto parties, this means that New Zealand faces unique challenges in 
emissions reduction. For most Kyoto Annex 1 parties, more than 75% of gross emissions are 
made up of CO2, while New Zealand‟s emissions profile is most similar to that of Argentina, 
a non-Annex 1 country.293 Correspondingly, there is a greater global emphasis placed on 
reducing emissions related to the energy sector due to the burning of fossil fuels; however, 
approximately 70% of New Zealand‟s energy is already derived from renewable sources such 
as hydro power, not from fossil fuels, meaning there is very little room for improvement in 
this area. The proportion of fossil fuel use in energy sector is increasing however, as are 
emissions from the transport sector, which currently account for approximately 19% of total 
greenhouse gas emissions placing New Zealand third in per capita terms behind the United 
States and Australia in 2006.294 Although the total contribution of New Zealand‟s greenhouse 
gasses is small in total global terms (accounting for approximately 0.5% of total global 
emissions),295 it makes a significant contribution to global emissions of carbon greenhouse 
gasses in per capita terms. Between 1990 and 2002, New Zealand‟s emissions increased 22% 
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while the average for OECD countries was just 7%.296 New Zealand‟s average per capita 
emissions are 20 tonnes of greenhouse gas, while the European average is 10 tonnes.297 
In short, the challenge for New Zealand in attempting to cut greenhouse gas emissions is that 
there are no „low hanging fruit,‟ areas where reductions would be achieved relatively easily. 
Instead, New Zealand focuses its attention at the international level on issues related to 
agricultural emissions and LULUCF, as these are areas that make significant contributions to 
the New Zealand economy, and to its emission profile, playing a particularly instrumental 
role in negotiations on LULUCF rules.298 As New Zealand‟s Trade Minister Tim Groser 
highlighted at the UNFCCC COP14 at Poznan in December of 2008, these are areas that are 
also of great importance to many non-Annex 1 countries. While Annex 1 countries focus 
their attention on industrial emissions, the commitments and rules surrounding agriculture 
and LULUCF will be important if non-Annex 1 parties are to make binding commitments in 
a post-2012 framework.299 
Currently, New Zealand participates in international negotiations on climate change in a 
range of fora. These include the Conferences of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Meetings of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol (MOPS), and its two Subsidiary Bodies, on Implementation (SBI) and 
Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA).300 New Zealand has been playing a significant 
role at international level negotiations. For example, David Parker, Minister for Climate 
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Change under the Labour Government, was one of 10 Ministers invited to attend a meeting 
hosted by the Polish Environment Minister, and New Zealand negotiators chair two key 
bodies within the UN framework. Helen Plume, a New Zealand Ministry for Environment 
senior advisor, is currently the chair of the SBSTA, while Bryan Smith of the Ministry for 
Agriculture and Forestry co-chairs the LULUCF working group.301  
The challenge posed by New Zealand‟s unique emission profile is also an opportunity, and 
New Zealand has generated considerable international interest in its domestic agricultural 
research into nitrification inhibitors and energy reduction.302 The Livestock Emissions and 
Abatement Research Network (LEARN) was established by the government at the end of 
2007 as a networking and information sharing tool for international agricultural researchers to 
enable them to collaborate on research into measuring agricultural emissions, methane and 
nitrous oxide livestock emissions, and integrated approaches to farm impacts.303 
5.2.3 European Union-New Zealand International Interaction on Climate Change 
The EU has been visibly proactive in its approach to climate change since prior to the 
UNFCCC negotiations began in 1992 when it set unilateral emissions reductions targets and 
has been widely credited as playing a pivotal role in global climate change negotiations.304 
New Zealand‟s development of its own domestic climate change policy, in particular the 
policy design of the emissions trading scheme, has provided an opportunity for New Zealand 
policy makers to work more closely with the EU.  
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In the past, the EU-New Zealand relationship was heavily focused on trade. In particular, the 
legacy of the United Kingdom‟s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
1973 had a lasting effect on the way that New Zealanders, including its policy makers, 
viewed the EU, and resulted in years of negotiations to ensure New Zealand‟s interests were 
protected. One of the participants interviewed in this research commented that, in their 
opinion, the legacy of this event is still apparent, and that negative attitudes toward the EU 
particularly in relation to trade are still evident among some policy officials.305 However, 
other policy officials who were asked for their opinion on this claim disagreed. One 
speculated that New Zealand‟s views tend to be relatively Anglo-Saxon and more in line with 
UK thinking, which is considered fairly Euro-sceptic, and that perhaps this was the source of 
the comment. However, the participant added they did not feel that there was any ongoing 
effect on policy officials‟ attitude towards the EU.306 
In the last two decades the EU-New Zealand relationship has widened and deepened to cover 
a range of policy areas, and environment has played an increasingly important part in the 
relationship. Within that context, issues related to climate change have taken centre stage, and 
have been the focus of a large part of the dialogue between the EU and New Zealand in 
recent years. For example, when former Prime Minister Helen Clark visited Brussels in 
October 2007, climate change was reported to have „dominated‟ her meetings with EU 
representatives.307 During the same visit, EC President Jose Manual Barroso was quoted as 
stating that he was well aware of New Zealand‟s progress with its (at that time) recently 
announced emissions trading scheme, and that he was eager for the EU and New Zealand to 
work together towards the establishment of an international carbon trading market.308  
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New Zealand operates within several levels of international negotiation and consultation on 
climate change which provide the framework for interaction with third parties such as the EU 
on environment.  
First, there is of course the formal, multilateral level of meetings and negotiation through the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. Within the UN context, New Zealand is a member of the 
JUSSCANNZ negotiating group. The name is an acronym of the original members: Japan, 
United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand. This group, along 
with the EU, is part of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), one of the five 
regional negotiating blocs traditional within United Nations negotiations. These regional 
groupings do not generally reflect common interests. Instead, states align themselves with 
other states with similar interests. For example, developing nations cooperate as the Group of 
77 (G-77) coalition, while small island nations, in light of their particular shared interests, 
interact and negotiate as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). However, the regional 
grouping of JUSSCANNZ did develop into a loose coalition in the Kyoto negotiations, and 
has since evolved, within the UN framework, into the Umbrella Group, made up of Australia, 
Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the US, 
with other nations occasionally participating or observing .309 They share a desire for a cost-
effective and flexible international system of climate change mechanisms, but their focus is 
on sharing information rather than generating common positions as there is great variation in 
the interests and domestic situations of the members.310 The Umbrella Group and the EU 
have disagreed on a number of issues throughout the course of UN climate negotiations. 
Areas of contention have included the EU‟s demand for a 50% cap on the number of credits 
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gained from CDM or JI projects, proposed out of concern that parties may use these 
mechanisms to avoid domestic measures altogether, while the Umbrella Group opposed 
limits. The Umbrella Group opposed binding measures for non-compliance, in contrast to the 
EU which argued for financial penalties,311 and has also been more vocal in pushing for 
debate on the role of developing countries should play in the climate change regime.312  
In addition to UN negotiations, New Zealand and the EU both participate in the Joint 
Working Party on Trade and the Environment at the OECD, which provides another forum 
for interaction.  
The next level involves the informal links that New Zealand policy makers have with think 
tanks and research centres such as the Pew Centre and CCAP (Centre for Clean Air Policy).  
A third level encompasses the formal bilateral agreements that New Zealand has with 
international actors, such as the formal climate change partnerships it has signed with both 
Australia and the US, one that has been concluded with the UK in a sustainability context and 
less formal arrangements such as the Joint Declaration with the EU. Agreements are being 
developed with China in the context of the FTA (Free Trade Agreement) and with Japan.313 
Phil Gurnsey, Manager of Climate Change Policy at the Ministry for the Environment (MfE) 
and responsible for coordinating the cross-government domestic work-programme on climate 
change, stated that within this bilateral context, New Zealand and the EU make an effort to 
have regular visits and consultation on climate change. Adrien Macey, New Zealand‟s 
Climate Change Ambassador visits relatively frequently. At the time of the development of 
the joint Declaration, Bruno Julien met with Gurnsey and Hugh Logan (former MfE CEO) to 
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discuss possibilities for climate change collaboration. The environment section of the Joint 
Declaration is focused particularly on this issue.314 
Also in this bilateral context, New Zealand is participating in Kyoto Protocol Joint 
Implementation (JI) projects with individual EU member states. To date, seven projects have 
been approved by MfE to be carried out in New Zealand by New Zealand suppliers, with the 
ERUs generated to be sold to the partner JI party. Three of these projects are in partnership 
with EU member states, namely France, Austria and the Netherlands. The details of two 
projects are still to be finalised but it appears likely that the United Kingdom will be a partner 
on at least one of them. 315  
5.3 Case study: Emissions Trading Cooperation 
Interaction between New Zealand and the EU on environment increased substantially in 2007 
when New Zealand was in the process of designing a national Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS). The EU had implemented its ETS, the largest multi-national scheme in the world and 
the central pillar of EU climate policy, in 2005. Policy officials from New Zealand 
cooperated closely with their EU counterparts as they designed the New Zealand scheme. 
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5.3.1 EU ETS Background 
The EU was initially reluctant to adopt emissions trading (ET) as a climate change policy 
tool, but as has been documented by Damro and Méndes,316 and by Loren Cass,317 throughout 
the course of the Kyoto Protocol they gradually came to accept ET as it was promoted 
particularly by the US but more accurately by the JUSSCANZ group,318 or Umbrella group as 
it came to be known. A former Ministry for Environment policy adviser and lead negotiator 
on the Kyoto Protocol from 1996 to 2002, stated that JUSSCANZ advocated for emission 
trading from the very beginning, based on the cap-and-trade scheme implemented in the US 
to reduce sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions. He further pointed out that some of the earliest 
literature on emissions trading in a climate change context was written by New Zealand, in 
particular papers produced by New Zealand within the Umbrella Group.319 In contrast, 
European resistance to emissions trading was based on greater experience with, and therefore 
a natural preference for, regulatory controls. The idea of selling the right to pollute was met 
with much scepticism, and the EU argued that reductions ought to occur domestically, 
portraying the mechanism as “an American attempt to buy its way out of reducing domestic 
emissions.”320 However, gradually, the benefits of a least cost approach to emissions 
reduction became clear and from 1998 the EU began to embrace ET.321 
The “Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in the EU” was published in March 
2000, making the case for an EU-wide scheme as the most efficient instrument available to 
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ensure the EU meets its Kyoto Protocol commitments.322 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the 15 
countries which were EU member states at the time of signing have a common target, set out 
in a burden sharing agreement and sometimes referred to as the “EU bubble” and must reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions by 8 % below 1990 levels during the 2008–12 Kyoto 
commitment period. The member states that acceded later have individual targets outside the 
„bubble‟.323  
In October 2001, the European Commission put forward a formal proposal for a framework 
directive for the EU to implement an emissions trading scheme. Schreurs and Tiberghien 
suggest that this may have also been an attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to bring the US back 
into the Kyoto process, given the US preference throughout negotiations for market-based 
mechanisms.324 
The EU commenced operation of its emissions trading scheme (ETS) in January 2005, 
according to Directive 2003/87/EC, which entered into force on 25 October 2003.325 It will 
allow the EU to meet its Kyoto obligations at a cost of 0.1% of GDP.326 
The goal of the EU ETS was to create incentives for industries to reduce carbon emissions 
and to encourage investment in less carbon-intensive technologies and services by putting a 
price on carbon and exploiting the variations in abatements costs of participating 
installations. The EU scheme is particularly targeted at the energy sector and the actual 
industrial installations emitting greenhouse gasses. It covers 40% of EU greenhouse gas 
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emissions and almost half of its carbon emissions, comprising approximately 10,000 large 
installations in the energy sector. It does not, for example, cover household emissions.327  
5.3.2 EU ETS Issues 
Current key design features of the scheme in phases 1 and 2 are that it targets stationary 
energy and industrial processes and concerns CO2 only. It works on a „cap-and-trade‟ basis - 
a fixed number of units are allocated to each member state based on factors such as Kyoto 
Protocol reduction obligations and GDP, then these are allocated by the state to affected 
domestic instillations in annual NAPs (National Allocation Plans). If a company uses more 
than its allowed amount of CO2, it must purchase additional units. If it uses less, it may sell 
the surplus. Each installation must monitor and report its carbon emissions, and must pay for 
those emissions using carbon allowances. Each allowance is equal to one tonne of carbon 
emitted. Installations that fail to meet their reporting and carbon emission payment 
obligations are fined. 328 It is currently in its second phase which runs from 1 January 2008 to 
31 December 2012.  
After its first phase (1 January 2005 – 31 December 2007) it was already apparent that there 
were serious problems with the design of the scheme.329 
One of the major issues to be addressed is the allocation of emissions allowances. 
Allowances are allocated freely, the idea being to gradually reduce the number of allowances 
given so that installations are gradually pushed towards emissions reductions. 
It is now clear that allocation in the first phase was overly generous. Allocations were based 
on industry projections of how many units they would need. Although the aim was to ease 
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industry into the scheme, the result was an over allocation of units and a substantial fall in the 
market value of carbon units. 
In particular, the experience of the first phases has shown that in the electricity sector, a 
number of companies made large windfall profits through free allocation. This is because 
although allocation of units is free, companies face either a cost or an opportunity cost by 
holding units. A large number of electricity companies in particular passed their opportunity 
cost on to consumers in the first phase by raising their prices.330 
A number of changes have been proposed for Phase III of the EU scheme based on initial 
experiences. In January 2008, the European Commission issued a draft directive outlining 
potential alterations to the structure of the scheme. It proposes expanding the scope of the 
scheme to include carbon dioxide emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium, 
as well as nitrous oxide emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and glyoxalic acid, 
and perfluorocompounds emissions from the aluminium sector.331 It advocates for the use of 
auctioning to distribute allowances, as this is consistent with the polluter pays principle, 
estimating that initially in 2013 (the first year of Phase III) two thirds of allowances will be 
distributed via auctioning, a proportion of the revenues from which would be used towards 
measures related to emissions reduction and climate change adaptation. This would do away 
with the previous system of NAPs.332  
The review also mentions the possibility of including carbon emissions from shipping, and 
refers to the inclusion of aviation emissions in the ETS. Ultimately, the EC hope for the ETS 
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to eventually include emissions from aviation, maritime transport and forestry.333 Having 
received final approval from the Council of the European Union in October 2008 and thus 
sealed into law,334 domestic aviation will be included from 2011 and, controversially, 
international aviation will be brought into the scheme from 2012, meaning all flights landing 
or departing from Europe will have to participate.  
Although emissions from aviation represent a small percentage of total GHG emissions, it is 
the fastest growing source of emissions. Total EU GHG emissions fell 3% between 1990 and 
2003, while emissions resulting from aviation increased 70% in the same period.335 Further, 
the impact of emissions from aviation is greater due to the effect of high altitude.336  
The inclusion of international aviation emissions in the EU ETS will of course significantly 
affect all airlines flying to and from Europe.337 This is a particularly sensitive issue for New 
Zealand, as it would mean considerable extra costs for Air New Zealand, in which the New 
Zealand government owns a 76.07% stake,338 as well as for travellers to and from the EU. 
The increased cost of long distance flights in and out of the EU has the potential to negatively 
affect tourism to New Zealand. In addition to the obvious economic ramifications that this 
move represents, New Zealand, along with countries like Australia and the United States, is 
strongly opposed to this inclusion based on a number of other points. Firstly, that it is 
arguably contrary to the Chicago Convention establishing the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO), according to which a signatory cannot unilaterally impose charges on 
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civil, scheduled aircraft entering its territory (Article 15); and secondly, it raises questions of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction, which is also contrary to the Chicago Convention (Article 1). 
The practical ramifications of the inclusion of international aviation are still not clearly 
elaborated. For example, it has been suggested that the scheme will avoid „double counting‟, 
as outlined by David Batchelor, Aviation Safety and Environment Policy Officer for the 
European Commission‟s DG Energy and Transport. He stated that where another state has an 
ETS in place covering aviation emissions, flights from that state to the EU would fall under 
the EU scheme, while flights from the EU to that state would be covered by that state‟s 
scheme.339  
The EU argues that the ETS is fully compliant with ICAO regulations and the Chicago 
Convention. They argue that it is not unilateral as three other non-EU countries are involved 
– Lichtenstein, Norway and Iceland – and that they intend for it to become multilateral, and 
further, that it is not a tax or a charge as set out in Article 15 of the Chicago Convention.340 
Aviation emissions are not covered by the Kyoto Protocol, but will likely be brought into the 
post-2012 framework to be decided at Copenhagen in December 2009.341 One can only 
speculate as to the motivations of the EU in venturing into such controversial territory, but it 
seems possible that the EU has grown frustrated with the lack of action and therefore results 
from ICAO in the 12 years that it has been charged by the UNFCCC with managing aviation 
emissions, as it has struggled to meet expectations in this area, resulting in increasing 
pressure from the UNFCCC as emissions from international aviation have trended upwards. 
With a functioning trading scheme already well established, the EU likely believes it is well 
placed to implement initial measures aiming to curb the rapidly rising emissions in this 
                                                 
339 E.U States Likely to Face Legal Action from the U.S over E.T.S Regardless of Who Wins Presidential 
Election, Says A.T.A (GreenAirOnline.com,  2008 [cited November 18 2008]); available from 
http://www.greenaironline.com/news.php?viewStory=245. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Reuters, ICAO Presses on with Global Emissions Trading Plan (2009); available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/feedarticle/8267860. 
124 
 
sector. Internationally, legal challenges on the grounds of the Chicago Convention are likely 
to come from the United States, Australia and the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA).342  
In January 2008 the EU announced that it had no immediate plans to bring maritime 
emissions into the scheme, preferring to wait and see how International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) managed efforts develop.343 However, later that year a report was 
commissioned on maritime emissions, and it is expected to include a recommendation on 
including maritime emissions in the ETS.344 Avril Doyle, European Parliament Rapporteur on 
the ETS stated in July of 2008 that she wanted shipping emissions included in the scheme no 
later than 2015.345  
5.3.3 New Zealand – EU interaction on Emissions Trading 
New Zealand and the EU have interacted closely with regard to the design and 
implementation of New Zealand‟s emissions trading scheme. Several policy officials 
interviewed over the course of this research between July and November 2008 agreed that 
most interaction between the EU and NZ on environment was on emissions trading, with 
most of the activity occurring between May and September 2007, leading up to the release of 
the Government‟s ETS framework, but with ongoing consultation and communication 
occurring as the framework was debated and further details clarified. 
New Zealand ETS background 
When New Zealand initially signed the Kyoto Protocol, policy officials believed that it would 
be a net exporter of carbon credits with a surplus of 33 million tonnes. This was one of the 
main arguments in favour of ratifying the Protocol. However, in 2005 when figures on the 
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impact of transport and exhaust emissions and the contribution of carbon sinks were revised it 
was clear that New Zealand would actually face a deficit of 36 million tonnes in meeting its 
Kyoto reduction obligations.346  
As outlined above, emissions reductions in New Zealand are particularly challenging. New 
Zealand already uses a high proportion of renewable energies in electricity generation 
(approximately 70%), and reducing emissions from transport is very difficult. Further 
complicating New Zealand‟s position is the unusually high proportion of methane and nitrous 
oxide in its emissions profile – almost 50% of total emissions – primarily as a result of the 
large agricultural sector.347 Despite New Zealand contributing approximately only 0.3% of all 
global emissions, per capita emissions are amongst the highest in the world. A recent report 
by the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) ranked New Zealand sixth globally behind United 
Arab Emirates, the United States, Kuwait, Denmark and Australia.348 
New Zealand has been a long standing proponent of emission trading as a policy tool to 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gasses, based on a preference for a least-cost and flexible 
approach. In 2001 and 2002, prior to the EU scheme‟s adoption, an emissions trading scheme 
was seriously considered by the Labour government as part of a package of climate change 
policy measures. Consultation on this proposal took place, with the resulting policy proposal 
put forward by the Labour Government favouring a capped carbon tax on energy, industrial 
and transport emissions over emissions trading. It included provision for large industrial 
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emitters concerned about the impact on their competitiveness to negotiate individual terms 
(Negotiated Greenhouse Agreements).349 
Later, the government also proposed a levy on methane and nitrous oxide emissions to fund 
research into the reduction of these primarily agriculture based emissions. However, due to 
considerable public and political pressure, both of these initiatives were eventually dropped, 
with the planned carbon tax officially abandoned in late 2005 after the general election.350  
An alternative package of measures was needed to ensure New Zealand would be able to 
account for its Kyoto deficit. Emissions trading had always been a part of the long term plan 
of New Zealand‟s climate change strategy and as already described, had advocated strongly 
for emissions trading throughout the Kyoto negotiations. Five discussion documents351 were 
released a year later in December 2006, with a range of proposals including, among others, 
emissions trading, a narrow based carbon charge, incentives, subsidies and voluntary 
measures. After consultation and discussion with public and industry stakeholders, an 
emissions trading scheme was decided upon as one of the government‟s preferred policy 
options and this was announced in October 2007.352 A Senior Ministry for the Environment 
adviser explained that an emissions trading scheme would likely have always been „Plan B,‟ 
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and that in any case, it has become increasingly apparent that emissions trading is where the 
rest of the world is heading.353 
As only the second actor in the world to implement a compulsory, nationwide ETS, New 
Zealand would benefit from increased authority in international negotiations. As a small 
country, New Zealand is reliant on other, larger international actors to take action on climate 
change. Without a domestic ETS, it would be difficult for New Zealand to have credibility 
and to try and tell others “what they should be doing if we (New Zealand) are not doing it 
ourselves.”354  
With a successful working model already in place in the form of the EU ETS, a process of 
cooperation and learning began.  
EU-New Zealand Cooperation 
As a senior Ministry for Environment staff member summarised, when the government 
decided on an ETS as New Zealand‟s core market-based climate change mechanism, policy 
officials “were keen to mine what (they) could from (the EU.)”355 
In May 2007 the government announced the establishment of a cross-ministry taskforce, 
called the Emissions Trading Group (ETG) and led by the Ministry for Environment, whose 
role was to design the policy for the New Zealand emissions trading scheme.356 Early in the 
research process in May 2007 an official delegation including members of this group 
travelled to Brussels to discuss possible approaches and learn from EU experience.357  
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A Treasury analyst who participated stated that generally speaking, there was a sense of 
common general principles between the EU and New Zealand, a sense that the two parties 
were closely placed ideologically on the broad issues related to climate change, even if they 
might not always agree on details. He acknowledged that the roles the two parties play at a 
global level are different, stating that the EU has played a greater role on framing the debate 
and deciding what value should be placed on emissions reductions.358 
The Emissions Trading Group worked closely with members of Directorate General (DG) 
Environment at the EC level but also cooperated with relevant departments in individual 
member states, for example the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affaris 
(DEFRA) in the UK. In addition, there was a great deal of communication with negotiators 
on Kyoto mechanisms in individual member states, 359 while DG Environment and MfE made 
use of video conferencing technology to enhance communication.360 
There have been a number of visits to New Zealand by European Commission 
representatives, as well as representatives from individual member states, particularly from 
the UK. Phil Gurnsey visited in September of 2008 and met with Commission officials.361 In 
addition to this bilateral dialogue, informal interaction also occurred within the context of 
regular UNFCCC meetings.362  
An official within the Emissions Trading Group stated that contrary to criticism often 
mounted against the EU as being confusing for third parties, they found it easy to deal with 
DG Environment, and that communication was consistently swift and efficient. They 
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suggested that their European counterparts were impressed at the speed with which policies 
can be implemented in New Zealand compared with in the EU.363 
Gurnsey stated that within the context of the EU-New Zealand relationship he has noticed a 
marked increase in focus on climate change in the two years he has been in his current role. 
He believes this is primarily due to development of the NZ ETS, stating that although it 
might be fair to say that New Zealand has more to learn from the EU than vice versa, the EU 
has been interested in innovations in the planned framework for the New Zealand scheme, in 
particular how New Zealand would bring agriculture and forestry into the scheme.364 
Participants interviewed during this research agreed that close cooperation with the EU has 
taken place on emissions trading. When some participants were questioned as to which party, 
if any, was particularly driving this interaction, all responded that while the EU has been a 
driving force and a leader in global terms through the implementation of its emissions trading 
scheme, on this particular issue New Zealand was the party pushing for interaction. In terms 
of the actual design of the scheme, there are aspects of the EU scheme which it would not 
make sense to apply in New Zealand, given economic differences and different priorities and 
challenges when it comes to reducing emissions. As one interview participant stated, “we 
(New Zealand) have learned from their (EU) mistakes,”365 and accordingly policy officials 
have designed a scheme that is actually substantially different to the EU model.  
5.3.4 What was learnt? New Zealand ETS design and comparison with EU scheme 
While the EU scheme in its first two phases is limited to carbon emissions from stationary 
energy and industrial processes, the New Zealand scheme would eventually be an “all 
sectors, all gasses” scheme, covering all six Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gasses, and the first 
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to attempt to include emissions generated by agriculture and forestry. Given the contribution 
of agriculture emissions to New Zealand‟s emissions profile it was particularly important to 
bring agriculture into the scheme, in order to produce a credible and effective ETS. 
The EU, along with other parties, has shown a great deal of interest in just how these two 
sectors in particular would be included. It is generally considered unlikely that the EU would 
ever attempt to bring these sectors into their own scheme; indeed, there is some concern in 
the EU as to the legitimacy of trading forestry units for energy units, as there are scientific 
uncertainties related to how to actually measure and monitor forestry units, and how forests 
will actually be affected to climate change. If forests which had been used as carbon sinks 
were to die off, those reductions would be lost. Instead the EU sees emissions reductions in 
the energy sector as a long term solution, and therefore this is the sole sector targeted in the 
first two phases of its scheme.366 Rather, the interest the EU has shown in the design of New 
Zealand‟s scheme is founded in the desire to ensure that, considering a future global market, 
trading schemes are robust and broadly compatible, 367 and of course to consider the potential 
implications for its own scheme. Individual member states have also shown interest in 
specific aspects of the scheme; France has shown considerable interest in work being carried 
out in New Zealand on nitrification inhibitors and energy reduction in agriculture.368 
One of the important lessons New Zealand policy makers learnt from the EU scheme was that 
by targeting energy providers, costs can be passed on to the consumer.369 The allocation of 
units is a crucial issue, representing a large transfer of wealth from taxpayer to industry, and 
in the EU experience already described, despite this wealth being transferred to industry, the 
design of the scheme allowed industry to gain windfall profits by passing their opportunity 
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cost onto consumers. The New Zealand scheme would not allocate units to businesses that 
could also do this.370 In addition, the New Zealand scheme takes an upstream approach, 
targeting fuel importers and producers, based on the assumption that cost will naturally flow 
„downstream‟ in due course. In contrast, the design of the EU scheme meant that obligation 
rested downstream. An ETG analyst pointed out that in the EU scheme, allocation and 
obligation are located at the same levels, whereas the New Zealand scheme has the flexibility 
to target different levels. For example, obligations can be targeted upstream by placing 
obligation on a fuel importer or producer, while credits can be allocated midstream to an 
industrial firm, as they will face the costs passed on from upstream.371  
The EU scheme limits the trading of emissions units which originate from outside the EU 
ETS, placing a cap on the amount of Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs) and Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs) units that can enter the scheme. It prohibits entirely the 
importation of Assigned Amount Units (AAU‟s), also known as „hot air‟ credits. These are 
credits resulting from a drop in emissions in Eastern European countries following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. They are the result of a significant industrial and economic 
slowdown, not reductions through improvement in efficiency, unlike quantifiable emissions 
reductions like ERUs or CERs, and are viewed with scepticism by many environmentalists.372 
There are also concerns that supply of AAUs could exceed demand for tradable units in the 
international carbon market. They are nonetheless legitimate units under the Kyoto Protocol 
and represent emissions that have not occurred. Unlike the EU scheme, the New Zealand 
scheme would allow the use of AAUs provided that they meet regulations on Green 
Investment by having been processed through a Green Investment Scheme (GIS), also known 
                                                 
370 Mark Storey, "The New Zealand ETS," in IETA Side Event, C.O.P 13 and C.M.P 3 (Bali: 2007). 
371 Emissions Trading Group Policy Adviser, "Interview with Author." 
372 Ibid. 
132 
 
as „greening‟ AAU credits.373 There are no limitations on the amount of AAUs that can be 
imported into the New Zealand ETS provided they are „green.‟374 
Because of the structure of the EU scheme, carbon prices in the EU are likely to be higher 
than the international average. This is because of the limitations placed on the use of 
developing country credits, the exclusion of AAUs, the focus on carbon and the exclusion of 
carbon sinks. The EU sees this as a long term advantage by avoiding global market 
fluctuations. For example, if AAU supply did exceed demand the EU would be protected 
from market collapse. New Zealand‟s scheme, however, needs to be fully linked 
internationally due to the small size of the market. The relatively closed EU model is not an 
option for New Zealand which cannot afford to isolate itself from the international market.375 
Further, the EU exclusion of AAUs versus New Zealand‟s decision to allow them could 
cause difficulty for future linking of the two schemes. In order to link schemes, parties must 
mutually recognise each other‟s units. A link with New Zealand would allow AAUs to 
indirectly enter the EU ETS scheme. 376 
The resulting instrument has been praised for its comprehensive coverage, innovation and for 
avoiding many of the difficulties encountered in the EU ETS framework, and has been 
described as arguably “one of New Zealand‟s most significant contributions to international 
climate change mitigation efforts,” ensuring a very credible platform for New Zealand in 
post-2012 framework negotiations.377 However, even with the emissions trading scheme in 
place, New Zealand would likely still face a shortfall of approximately 20 million tonnes of 
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credits in accounting for its first commitment period targets, which would still need to be 
purchased from the international market.378 
In September 2007 the details for the planned New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme were 
released to the public, and the Climate Change (Emissions Trading) Bill was passed a year 
later in September 2008, with the scheme due to come into effect from January 1 2009. The 
forestry sector was to have retrospective obligations from 1 January 2008, with other sectors 
entering from 1 January 2010. However, after the November 2008 New Zealand general 
election the incoming National party-led Government, under the terms of its coalition 
agreement with the ACT party, delayed the scheme‟s entry into force until January 1 2010, 
pending further review. 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
Dialogue on climate change and emissions trading has played a significant role in EU-New 
Zealand relations in recent years. In the wider context of international negotiations on climate 
change, while the EU and New Zealand can be said to agree on the broad issues involved, 
they have taken different approaches to some specific details. Broadly speaking, in the Kyoto 
negotiations, on some issues New Zealand‟s position was closer to that taken by other 
Umbrella Group members than that of the EU, the driving force in negotiations. While it 
could be argued that the EU and New Zealand share similar values in their broad approach to 
climate change, and while they worked closely together as New Zealand designed its ETS in 
2007, the variations between their respective needs and interests mean that there are 
inevitable areas of difference. 
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5.4.1 Normative Power 
An EU normative power explanation of New Zealand‟s relations with the EU on climate 
change would require evidence of the EU actively influencing a fundamental change in New 
Zealand‟s position on climate change, or on emissions trading, by virtue of normative 
influence. While the EU certainly has played a prominent role in international climate change 
negotiations and actively promotes international attention to climate change, and while the 
subject has been said to dominate meetings between the EU and New Zealand, it cannot be 
shown that New Zealand‟s approach to climate change policy or that its adoption of an 
emissions trading scheme is attributable to EU normative power. In general terms, the EU, as 
a leader in the climate change regime, has influenced the direction of international climate 
change negotiations and has been able, to an extent, to frame debate and set the agenda. It has 
been argued elsewhere that the EU exercises normative power in this broad context.379 
However, it is neither plausible nor verifiable to argue a direct normative impact on New 
Zealand.  
The key weakness of a normative power argument in this case is as follows: As highlighted in 
chapter two, Thomas Diez argued that in order to argue the case for normative power, it must 
be shown to stand on its own, unable to be reduced to economic or military power.380 
Therefore, if normative power were a plausible framework in this case, it would be possible 
to demonstrate that the EU engages in dialogue on environment with New Zealand for 
reasons other than material self-interest. However, in the case of the emissions trading, it is 
clear that while the EU was under no obligation to cooperate with New Zealand policy 
makers in the design process of the New Zealand ETS, it had clear interest in the outcome 
due to implications for future international linkages between schemes, the future international 
carbon market and thus of course for the EU‟s own scheme. 
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Equally, it would be possible to show that New Zealand policy on climate change evolved in 
line with EU policy for reasons other than material interests linked to the EU‟s economic 
weight, perhaps even taking action that appeared to go against its interests based on 
normative arguments. However, as has been demonstrated, New Zealand‟s approach to 
cooperation with the EU on climate change and emissions trading has been pragmatic, by 
choosing to focus on areas of high economic priority in international negotiations and, in the 
case of the design of the ETS, learning from EU mistakes and picking and choosing those 
ideas that are applicable to New Zealand‟s situation and rejecting those that are not. In each 
case, New Zealand‟s motivations and decision making is firmly grounded in material 
interests. 
Secondly, there is no evidence that the ideas exchanged in the context of the bilateral 
relationship are norms or values. New Zealand can be said to share core norms and values 
with the EU due to its colonial links with Britain. Indeed, the political discourse between the 
EU and New Zealand emphasises this aspect of the relationship. Interview participants also 
alluded to this and the belief that it is in part because of this background of shared values and 
understanding that effective, clear dialogue is possible. However, as discussed, in 
international negotiations New Zealand has followed its own interests, particularly economic 
interests. Due to the traditional structure of UN negotiations New Zealand shares information 
within the JUSSCANNZ group and Umbrella Group, and it has sometimes taken positions 
that are at odds with the EU view. In relation to emissions trading, the decision to look to the 
EU was largely a matter of convenience, as the EU scheme was the only national carbon 
trading scheme in operation and had been underway for more than two years when NZ began 
the design process.  
Indeed, with specific reference to emissions trading, if there is a potential case to be made for 
a normative influence it would be in the context of the influence of New Zealand and the 
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JUSSCANZ/Umbrella group in the Kyoto negotiations on the EU position. The EU, having 
entered the negotiations with a clear preference for regulatory controls, gradually came to 
endorse market mechanisms as a vital climate policy tool. If it can be argued that emissions 
trading is now an international norm it is due to New Zealand and JUSSCANNZ promotion 
of the mechanism and its subsequent inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol. While Damro and 
Mendés characterised this as a policy learning experience,381 Loren Cass argued that the 
actual change in position in international negotiations was best explained in normative 
terms.382  
5.4.2 Policy Transfer and Small State Theory 
A policy transfer explanation incorporating small state theory is better suited to explaining 
the dynamics of EU-New Zealand relations on climate change, as it considers the exchange 
of ideas and knowledge in terms of policies rather than abstract values, and emphasises New 
Zealand‟s particular need as a small state for a pragmatic approach to foreign policy on this 
issue. Specifically, small state theory helps to explain New Zealand‟s broad interaction with 
the EU on climate change including its role in international institutions, while a policy 
transfer approach can be applied to the specific study of interaction on emissions trading. 
Consistent with a small state theory explanation, New Zealand works within the international 
climate change regime to balance its economic needs and priorities with its need to ensure 
that effective action on climate change occurs. As a country with an economy that relies 
heavily on the primary sector and on hydro power for almost 70% of its energy, New Zealand 
is vulnerable to the anticipated effects of climate change. It is also a small country, and must 
rely on the actions of bigger, more powerful actors to make a real difference. Therefore 
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domestic action taken by New Zealand is less important in terms of actual reductions towards 
solving the problem, but of great value and benefit to New Zealand in terms of its 
international credibility: allowing New Zealand a moral platform from which to promote and 
encourage action by other parties with the potential to make a greater impact, and because 
New Zealand‟s emissions profile has more in common with developing countries than with 
industrialised countries, it may also be able to play a role in helping to negotiate binding 
commitments for non-Annex 1 parties in the future.  
New Zealand focuses its resources internationally on climate change issues that matter most 
to its economy, such as agriculture and LULUCF issues, and more recently issues related to 
aviation emissions. It concentrates its interaction on climate change through international 
institutions such as the UN framework and the OECD. While it has described the challenge of 
climate change in normative terms in the past, describing a responsibility to take action to 
“lead by example,”383 this is consistent with Henderson‟s small state behavioural 
framework384 and is also underpinned by concern for its economic interests and priorities.  
New Zealand‟s decision to implement an emissions trading scheme, as this chapter has 
demonstrated, was based in pragmatism and material interest. Firstly, New Zealand faces a 
shortfall in meeting its Kyoto obligations; instead of being a net seller of credits, as was 
believed at the time of ratification, New Zealand will need to purchase credits on the 
international carbon market. By devolving some of this cost to industry, whether via the ETS 
or via a carbon tax as previously suggested, the government can reduce its costs and therefore 
the cost to taxpayers. Secondly, the Kyoto Protocol is in effect a cap-and-trade scheme, and 
emissions trading could be described as the international norm. As more and more actors 
implement domestic trading schemes, international linkages will become important. There 
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were therefore compelling reasons to ensure the New Zealand scheme was consistent with 
international developments and trends. Beyond the fact that the EU ETS was the only 
national ETS in operation at the time the New Zealand scheme was designed, given the EU‟s 
role in the international climate change regime and its economic power, it would be 
pragmatic and forward thinking to ensure that New Zealand‟s scheme was in line with that of 
the EU. 
As has been shown, New Zealand worked closely with the EU on the design of its ETS. A 
policy transfer approach, with particular reference to Dolowitz and Marsh‟s distinctions 
between voluntary, direct coercive and indirect coercive transfer,385 helps to explain the 
dynamics of this interaction. As established in chapter two, direct coercive transfer is not 
applicable in the case of EU-New Zealand relations, leaving indirect coercive and voluntary 
transfer as possible explanations. Recalling that Dolowitz and Marsh included economic 
pressure and international consensus as possible „push‟ factors applicable to indirect coercive 
transfer, and considering the factors leading New Zealand to design an ETS outlined above – 
economic factors and emissions trading emerging as an international norm – it is possible to 
argue that New Zealand‟s ETS policy was perhaps not entirely voluntary. However, the final 
scheme was substantially different from the EU model, highlighting the voluntary policy 
learning that occurred as a result of the research process. Further, according to Rose‟s386 
classification of degrees of transfer, the particular transfer that occurred was emulation, in 
which the fundamentals of a policy a transferred while allowing for adaptation to a different 
context.  
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6: Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the conceptual and practical implications of the thesis. It is divided 
into sections addressing these outcomes with respect to the principal theoretical approaches 
used throughout this research with reference to the original research question: How valid is 
the concept of EU normative power in explaining efforts to develop a cooperative 
relationship between the EU and New Zealand on environmental issues when compared with 
theories of policy studies? How, by analysing interactions and identifying areas of potential 
common interests, could this relationship be further enhanced?  
6.1 Conceptual Outcomes 
6.1.1 Normative Power 
From the outset, the use of normative power as a theoretical framework was going to be 
empirically challenging. Normative power has been applied to the EU‟s influence on 
accession countries and in specific international policy areas. Nevertheless, attempting to 
apply normative power to relations with a third party and across a range of policies has 
highlighted how vague it is as a concept and how empirically it is difficult to demonstrate. 
The research was designed in order to minimise these difficulties as much as possible. 
In Chapter Two, it was argued that for normative power to be shown, it must not be reducible 
to military or economic power. Therefore, as outlined in the hypothesis section of Chapter 
Two, in order to show normative power, it was expected that it would be necessary to show 
evidence of New Zealand engaging with the EU on environment, or adopting environmental 
policy from the EU, for reasons that could not be reduced to economic or material interests. It 
would have to be demonstrated that the EU had contributed to the increasing attention paid to 
environmental issues within the EU-New Zealand relationship and in New Zealand politics, 
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and to the subsequent adoption of environmental policies. Instead, the case studies carried out 
have shown consistently that aspects of the relationship that might be considered normative 
power at first glance can in fact be shown to be based on the economic power of the EU. 
There is no question that the EU has played a pivotal role in the international climate change 
regime, and is a world leader in chemicals regulation and hazardous waste management and 
in environmental research. As this thesis has touched on briefly, its role in these areas can be 
explained by a combination of economic interests and political opportunism. However, as 
was argued in Chapter Two when defining this thesis‟ interpretation of normative power, the 
motivation of the EU is not as important to the research question as the effect, if any, that the 
EU actually has on New Zealand politics and policy, and New Zealand‟s motivations for 
engaging with the EU. Normative power is not power if it does not have an effect. If there is 
no measurable effect, how can it be proven to exist? It is for this reason that the focus of 
research and argument has been New Zealand‟s motivations and policies. 
Indeed, there seems to be a fundamental lack of clarity as to what normative power actually 
is. In Manners‟ original depiction he explained it as the EU‟s “principles, actions and impact 
in world politics,” diffusing norms internationally without material motivation.387 Some 
scholars of normative power, such as Zaki Laïdi, have interpreted this to mean the promotion 
and diffusion of particular standards, policies or regulations.388 However, the diffusion of 
policies represents something quite different to the diffusion of norms.  The diffusion of 
policies leads away from the constructivist concepts of perception and identity that are a 
fundamental part of considering the diffusion of international norms, towards rationalist 
concepts which consider material factors. While both address the role and spread of ideas, 
they take fundamentally different approaches to these questions. It is for this reason that the 
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theoretical framework of this thesis was designed to compare and contrast these two 
interpretations of ideas and their diffusion across borders.  
In terms of effect on policy, the case studies have shown that it cannot be demonstrated that 
adoptions of EU regulations in New Zealand, changes in New Zealand environmental policy 
or stance in international negotiations have been for „normative‟ reasons, or reasons other 
than material. Instead, they have been shown to be squarely grounded in pragmatism and 
material interest.  
However, in Chapter Three, which considered the environmental policy-making processes in 
New Zealand and the EU, and gave an overview of their respective environmental 
„identities,‟ it was found that at the domestic level, public perception and ideas relating to the 
environment can play an important part in policymaking. This was argued by Christoff and 
Buhrs in relation to the strong focus in New Zealand environmental activism on conservation 
issues,389 and was also argued to be relevant in the case of the EU‟s strong interpretation of 
the precautionary principle, linking it to serious public health scares in the past.  
Therefore, this thesis cannot argue that these factors are irrelevant to the domestic 
policymaking process. It is clear that in many cases the importance placed on environmental 
policy reflects public perception and opinion of the environment, and thus may contribute to 
domestic policies and to a state‟s international position on environmental issues along with 
material factors. Analysis of these perceptions and ideas could allow for a deeper 
understanding of environmental policies and politics.  
However, the case studies carried out in subsequent chapters did not provide sufficient 
evidence to show any kind of transfer of these domestic values and ideas in the context of the 
EU-New Zealand relationship on environment. Instead, this thesis argues that New Zealand‟s 
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relationship with the EU on environment and New Zealand‟s adoption of EU regulation 
occurs because the EU and New Zealand, based on historical context, already share 
fundamental norms and values. What is exchanged are policies and knowledge, not norms 
and values, and the most complete account of this exchange can be provided by a policy 
studies approach which incorporates material interests. 
The increased attention given to environmental issues and policy in New Zealand, in 
particular climate change, cannot be directly attributed to EU normative power and the EU‟s 
role as a leader in climate change negotiations. Instead, it is best explained within the context 
of developments in the wider international community, increasing scientific consensus, public 
pressure, and consideration of economic factors. Alternatively, normative power could 
perhaps be applicable to the role of the EU in driving international political consensus on the 
issue. 
This thesis does not and cannot argue conclusively that normative power does not exist, only 
that in the context of this specific case study and specific relationship there is no evidence of 
it. It cannot be demonstrated with any credibility that New Zealand‟s interaction with the EU 
is based on, or influenced by the EU as a normative power. This conclusion would seem to 
indicate that depictions of the EU as a „green‟ normative power are perhaps exaggerated, 
particularly if discussing the role of the EU in bilateral relations. It would seem that where 
the EU can be depicted as acting as a normative power, it can equally be depicted as an 
economic one. 
The wider implications for this finding are that normative power as an approach might be 
limited to certain specific contexts or policies. Normative power has been applied to the role 
of the EU on specific policy issues related to the environment before. Zaki Laïdi argues that 
Manners‟ approach is limited to “equating Europe's normative action on the global scene with 
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the ideals on which European integration is based.”390 Thus normative power is conceivably 
less a testable framework of analysis than it is a descriptive concept for explaining the EU‟s 
particular post-Westphalian international personality.  
At the start of this thesis it was suggested that a constructivist approach to the EU-New 
Zealand relationship on environment could help explain international cooperation on 
environmental issues, where it appears that states are increasingly asked to take action 
without material incentive. It was proposed that understanding bilateral cooperation on 
environment could help understand what normative and value driven motivations persuade 
states to cooperate internationally. However, the results of this thesis suggest that states do 
not cooperate on environment for normative reasons, or out of the belief it is for the greater 
good. It is because states have come to understand that it makes economic sense to cooperate 
now to avoid losses in the future, or because of economic advantages to be gained. Therefore 
the key to driving international cooperation on environment does not lie in normative 
considerations or arguments, but in finding material incentives for states to participate. 
6.1.2 Small State Theory  
Recalling Henderson‟s behavioural framework,391 small state theory can account for New 
Zealand‟s international engagement on environment, and also its relations with the EU on 
environment.  
Consistent with small state theory, New Zealand has chosen specific environmental issues to 
focus its attention on internationally and targets its international representation where it is 
most needed, taking advantage of informal connections where possible.  
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Furthermore, it has been demonstrated repeatedly throughout the thesis that New Zealand‟s 
international action on environment and its relations with the EU are always in line with New 
Zealand‟s economic interests. The major differences of opinion highlighted in this thesis 
come down to New Zealand‟s concern for exporters and the EU‟s desire to protect itself from 
competition. Economics and material interests have been shown to be at the heart of this 
relationship.  
As was shown in Chapters Three, Four and Five, the vast majority of New Zealand‟s 
international interaction on environment takes place through institutions such as the OECD 
and the UN, and through negotiations for multilateral agreements. Indeed, as has been stated, 
much informal interaction takes place in the context of meetings of these bodies. This reflects 
the behavioural framework proposed by Henderson, as New Zealand maximises its resources 
by focussing its attention only on those issues that are particularly relevant. 
6.1.3 Policy Studies 
A policy studies approach has proven to be a more accurate explanation for the exchange of 
ideas in the EU-New Zealand relationship. Rather than, as normative power and 
constructivism argue, an exchange of norms and values taking place, instead policies and 
knowledge are exchanged. Because the overall EU-New Zealand relationship on environment 
is relatively ad hoc in nature, a policy studies approach, which analyses each party‟s domestic 
policy preferences on particular issues, and can incorporate constructivist concepts such as 
perception, enables a clearer understanding of the motivations and interests driving relations. 
In the case of the EU Chemicals Directive adopted as the New Zealand Cosmetics Standard 
described in Chapter Four, this is accounted for by the fact that the EU makes up the majority 
of global chemicals trade and thus has a powerful influence on the global market. Further, the 
substantial financial resources of the EU allow it to carry out extensive testing of chemical 
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safety, generating one of the largest databases in the world. New Zealand does not have the 
capability to carry out such tests on every new chemical product that enters the market, and 
thus accessing EU data makes good sense. Finally, the EU in the form of REACH has now 
implemented the most sophisticated, rigorous and comprehensive regulatory framework in 
the world.  Taking these factors into account it is not difficult to understand why New 
Zealand effectively imported this Directive. 
In Chapter Five, in the case of emissions trading, policy transfer can again account for the 
exchange of ideas while normative power cannot. It is shown that New Zealand policymakers 
learnt from the EU emissions trading scheme, as the EU ETS was the only compulsory 
trading scheme in operation at the time, and adapted it to suit the particular needs of New 
Zealand.  
Indeed, the policy learning process worked both ways. As stated in Chapter Five, New 
Zealand, along with the US and other members of the JUSSCANNZ group in Kyoto 
negotiations, had been one of the first proponents of emissions trading as a policy mechanism 
in the international climate change regime. Thus policy studies can account for the policy 
learning process in which the EU came to embrace emissions trading, something which 
normative power is not equipped to explain. 
6.2 Practical Outcomes 
In addition to the conceptual findings it has presented, this thesis has also provided a 
technical account of the EU-New Zealand political and policy interaction on environment.  
It has shown while EU-New Zealand interaction on environment has steadily increased since 
the 1991 Science and Technology Cooperation Arrangement, the most active bilateral 
cooperation has occurred in the areas of chemical and hazardous waste management, 
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research, science and technology and emissions trading. These are all areas where New 
Zealand‟s interests have aligned with those of the EU, making cooperation a possibility. At 
the multilateral level, where relations on biodiversity, and trade and environment occur, 
differences of opinion are evident and are related to trade. However, due to the shared values 
upon which the relationship is built, and strong relations bilaterally, this has not proven to be 
seriously detrimental to the relationship. 
While one participant claimed that a negative bias towards the EU, dating from the trade 
disputes of the 1970s, exists within New Zealand Government ministries, others, admittedly 
ministry staff, refuted the claim. Indeed it seems possible that what the participant identified 
as a bias is the result of the fact that the differences of opinion in the EU-New Zealand 
relationship on environment have been related to trade issues, which is symptomatic of the 
close linkages between these policy areas. In order for effective cooperation to continue and 
be enhanced, these linkages need to be fully understood.  
Ultimately, the relationship on environment is pragmatic and ad hoc, and relies on the 
existence of significant material incentives, particularly on the part of New Zealand. The day-
to-day technical aspect of the relationship occurs at the policy level, where personal linkages 
and informal connections are important given New Zealand‟s status as a small state. The 
relationship will continue to be effective provided that both parties continue to share the same 
broad values and objectives when it comes to environment, and that their interests continue to 
coincide in the areas of climate change, research, science and technology, and chemical and 
hazardous waste management. A potential area of future collaboration at the international 
level could include whaling. The EU has recently begun to develop a common position in the 
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International Whaling Commission (IWC)392 and this could be an area where like-minded 
policies and interests could coincide. 
The immediate future of the EU-New Zealand relationship on environment will likely take a 
back seat to economic issues as a result of the global financial crisis, as environmental issues 
will likely be lower on the agenda than they have been recently. The likelihood of further 
collaboration and policy exchange on emissions trading is currently on hold until the end of 
2009 as the current National Government reviews the proposed New Zealand Emissions 
Trading Scheme. Should the scheme go ahead, it could open up new avenues of research into 
climate change policy and cooperation. 
It is anticipated that this thesis will prove a valuable contribution to future studies of 
international environmental relations. As the international community increasingly faces 
environmental challenges that can only be met through cooperation, it is hoped that this thesis 
has increased understanding of how and why states collaborate on environmental issues, 
while addressing the identified gap in the literature on EU normative power. 
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